Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Revue de Presse-Press Review-Berhevoka Çapê-Rivista Stampa-Dentro
de la Prensa-Baszn Özeti
.•So I would want to see ~ situation
where we are able to solve our differences
diplomatically," he said. •
UN arms experts want to determme
whether.Iraq bas continw;d acquiring
weapons of mass ~struction - ~ key
element in any easms of UN sanctio~
imposed when Bagbdad's troops m-
vac1ed Kuwait in 1990. .
"We will be pressing for the return of
the inspectors," Annan said. "The question
o{inspectors and the return of inspectors
bas been one of the key bones.
of contention bet\Wen the United Nations
and Iraq."
At the start of the discussions in Annan'I
office, the secretary-general and
the foreign minister met privately for
about 20 minutes before be111fjoined by
their delegations, Eckhard said. .
Hans Blix. the chief UN weapons inspector,
sat next to Annan in the talks
spoke, as did a UN l~l couDseL Ralph
Zacklin. Sabri alone spoke for his dele-
.gation, which included General Hussan
Amin, the Iraqi government's chief liaison
official with the UN inspectors.
The arms inspectors, who tried to determine
whether Iraq had weapons of
mass destruction, left the country on
the eve of a U.s.-British bombing raid in
December 1999.They have not been allowed
to return since.
The most recent resolution governing
inspections and a suspension of sanctions
was adopted by the UN Security
Council in December 1999. .
Under that measure, the UN inspectors
get 60 days after their return to establish
a work p~m and draw up a
list of key remainmg tasks. Once they
say Iraq has begun cooperating. the Security
Council will wait 120 days and
then suspend sanctions for renewable
periods ofOO days each.
But the council has Dot vet defmed
how anèl what elements of the sanctions
would ~pended.
Blix ariaother experts believe Iraq
had nearly accounted for its nuclear
materials and ballistic missiles when
the teams left. But gaps remain in accounting
for chemical and biological
weapons materials.
The Bush administration, which is
demanding inspections and at the same
time considering ways to topple President
Saddam Hussein, hopes the talks
will be brief and direct.
Several UN officials believe the
threat of an American àttack was taken
as a real one, and in part accounted for
the meeting requested by Iraq.
"'!be fllSt session of the ta1ks was positive,.
the otrlcial Iraqi press agency,
INA, quoted Sabri.:as saying. It gave no
detailS on whether Iraq would accept the
return of the inspectors. (Reuters, AFP)
Allies • By Christoph Bertram
Europe must get serious on Iraq
RERUN
The chief objective in dealing
with Saddam Hussein's Iraq
must be to get the UN inspectors
bad: and working.
Whatever the ultimate plans of the
Bush adminis~ the fact remains
that u.s. threats of eventual military
iri~ are helpful towards this
goà1 while EuropeO IgOnizing over it
IS not. Three factS 'need to be kept in
~minds. .
The first is that. the prohibition of
QlISI destruction weapons in Iraq and
.rea~tive verÎflcatÎon through UN
inspectors has u its basis a binding
UN Security Council resolution.
Second, only when the members of
the Security CoW1ciI, u well u the
United States and Europe, are united
behind the demand for effective inspections
do they staDd a chance to
get their way.
Third, ifIraq should contÎ.Dueto disregard
its commitment to allow the inspectors
in and let them to do their job,
o~ those who want to weaken the
Umted Nations can turn a blind eye.
Perhaps the "smart sanctions"
which the Security Council is expected
to impose in May willlead to Iraq
readmittinB the inspectors. But if they
do not, other means including military
lICtÎonwould be justified.
The mere threat of such action by
the United States has already had the
positive effect ofmaking Saddam Hussein
think of the consequences if he
continues to flaunt UN resolutions on
weapons of mass destruction.
As Europeans should remember
from the decades when deterrence of
the Soviet Union provided for their security,
threats only work if they are
credible. There is no doubt that the
Bush administration is determined to
have in place a serious militaryoption
to overthrow the Saddam regime.
Those wanting the inspectors back
must be grateful for it.
It is true that many in Washington
want to crush Saddam regardless of
whether he honors his UN commitments
or not. But the president has not
yet endorsed this view, and, even if he
had, Iraqi readi- tobow to the UN's
demands would make him reconsider.
It is ODe thing to punish Iraqi violations
of UN resolutions; it is a totally different
one to strike a cooperative Iraq.
True, the chances of Iraq becoming
cooperative under Saddam are slim. If
past behavior is any guide, the cautious
feelers which the regime is curréDtly
putting out towards the United
Nations are likely to be mere tactical
maneuvers to gain time and divide the
West. In the end, there may be no alternative
to using force where international
law, diplomatic eressure, economic
sa.octions and mllitary threats
have been to no avall.
If it comes to that, will the Europeans
really want to stay aside? They
can scarcely object to Washington's
renewed pressure for a return of the
inspectors. At least now European
governments are joining in. Unless
they want to undermine the UN's authority
and the credibility ofU.S. pressure,
they must not rule out the military
option. Indeed, they have no other
cholce than to support it.
Some would claim that clever u.s.
tactics have painted Europe into this
comer of having to endorse in words
what it does not want in deeds. In fact,
it is the regime in Iraq which has
painted the United Nations, and Europeans
who care about its authority, into
that comer. There is no escape from
accepting the responsibility. Europea.o
governments must therefore not only
reiterate their condemnation of Iraqi
stonewalling and the demand for the
return of inspectors able to inspect.
They must also lobby in the United Nations
for using force should Saddam
faUto bend to other pressures.
This will not come easy to European
leaders who share with their voters a
deep skepticism toward using force
for political ends. Yet standing up for
the United Nations and against Saddam
now is not only the correct policy,
it is also a wise one. It will add to the
pressure on Iraq and thus increase the
chances for avoiding military intervention.
It also puts any subsequent
use offorce into an established framework
of international law. Furthermore,
by demonstrating European
commitment it will strengthen an Atlantic
relationship now strained by
sus~icion and resentment.
Flnally, it will allow European governments
to shape the issue lnstead of
being hypnotized by what the United
States might or might not do. Many
countries, most prominently France
this summer and Germany this fall,
will hold national elections under the
shadow of what could be a showdown
with Iraq. Whatever their current reservations,
it is difficult to imagine
major European governments opposing
outright a U.S. action justified by
Baghdad's refusal to honor UN demands.
Unless they offer their own I
publics the framework of their policy
soon, they may find that public opinion
has deserted them when they need
its support most.
The writer, director of the German
Institute for International and Security
Affairs, contributed this comment to the
International Herald Tribune.
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