Hvilken rolle spiller det militære instrument i konflikter om ressourcer ...

Jeg finder ud fra disse betragtninger, at Copeland’s teori er velegnet til at klarlægge de dynamikker, som
de enkelte aktører agerer efter i rivaliseringen om ressourcerne i Det Sydkinesiske Hav. Dilemmaet mel‐
lem enegang (forventet gevinst ved handel negativ) og samarbejde (forventet gevinst ved handel posi‐
tiv) synes at være fremtrædende i dette spændingsfyldte område.
Copeland sammenfatter kerneelementerne i de rivaliserende teorier, hhv. liberalisme‐, realisme‐ og
økonomisk forventningsteorierne i et klar og overskueligt skema. Jeg har gengivet disse i figur 2.1, hvor
det er kolonnen med Trade Expectations Theory som sammenfatter teoriens kernebegreber. 49
Figur 2.1 The competing Theories
Core Liberal Theory
(e.g. Rosencrance)
19
Core Realist Theory
(e.g. Waltz, Mearsheimer)
Nature of the system Anarchy Anarchy Anarchy
Nature of the state Generally a rational, unitary
calculator of costs/benefits,
but may also have aggressive,
unit‐level drives
Analytical focus The individual state’s concern
for its own dependence
State’s decision for war or
peace driven by
Ultimate reason that state
goes to war
Reason for state choosing to
stay at peace
Benefits of trade (the “gains
from trade” from specializa‐
tion)
If level of dependence low
(i.e., trade is low), “restraint”
on unit‐level aggressive
tendencies removed
If level of dependence high
(i.e., trade is high), then high
dependence “restrains” by
making benefits of trade
greater than value of war
Rational, unitary actor seek‐
ing to reduce vulnerability to
improve security
The individual state’s concern
for its own dependence
Costs of severed trade (the
costs of adjustment after
being cut off, due to speciali‐
zation)
High dependence creates a
systemic incentive to use
force to overcome vulnerabil‐
ity
Low dependence removes
another systemic incentive
for war
Trade Expectations Theory
(Copeland)
Rational, unitary actor calcu‐
lating the expected stream of
benefits and costs over the
foreseeable future, to maxi‐
mize wealth and therefore
security
The individual state’s concern
for its own dependence
Benefits of trade and costs of
severed trade, plus expecta‐
tions of future trade
High dependence and pessi‐
mistic expectations for future
trade, creating a low or nega‐
tive expected value for trade
High dependence and opti‐
mistic expectations for future
trade, creating a high ex‐
pected value for trade
NOTE: All three theories recognize that relative power affects the value of the “invade” option; hence, Figure 1 focuses on
aspects of the “trade” option that affect the decision for war or peace.
Som anført i kapitel 1, omfatter problemerne i Det Sydkinesiske Hav primært en forventning om fremti‐
dige ressourcegevinster (olie/gas), allerede kendte fiskeriressourcer og søværts transportveje. Der er
foregået en vis militær oprustning blandt aktørerne gennem mange år.
På baggrund af teoriredegørelsen tegner der sig et groft billede af, hvilke dele af problemkomplekserne,
som det vil være relevant at operationaliseringen – og dermed analysen – skal rettes mod.
49 Copeland (1996), p. 24 (tabellen er gengivet ubearbejdet).