Schienenverkehr – sicher, leise, effizient - (IRT) der RWTH Aachen

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12 Schienenverkehr – sicher – leise Inappropriate CE dimension for train (wayside) DIMENSION CE Loading exceeds CE of train Abb. 2: Beispiel eines generischen Fehlerbaumes Neutralisierende Faktoren sind passive Ereignisse, die einen Unfall als „glücklichen Umstand“ nicht eintreten lassen. (Abb. 5) Die Eigenschaften der (generischen) Barrieren werden im Barrier Quantifi cation Model BQM beschrieben und können dort quantitativ defi niert werden. Abb. 3: Liste der Starting Point Hazards Open doors (esp. freight trains) Barrier Quantifi cation Model BQM: Eine Matrix enthält alle Elemente, die die generischen Barrieren beschreiben. ROSA beinhaltet die Struktur und die mathematische Verknüpfung innerhalb der Matrix, nicht jedoch spezifi sche Daten, die ja implementierungsabhängig sind. Das Berechnungstool, das diese Struktur beinhaltet, enthält eine Schnittstelle, mit deren Hilfe das Tool über eine MS-Excel-Tabelle mit spezifi schen Daten versorgt werden kann und die Verbindung zur Software Fault-Tree-PLUS herstellt. Initial wrong determination of speed limit (related to infrastructure) | Wrong determination of speed limit (train related) | Wrong braking distance determined / Wrong speed profi le / Wrong braking curves | Insuffi cient deceleration (physical causes) | Wrong/ inappropriate speed/ brake command | Wrong speed registered (wrong v_train) | Failure of speed limit communication | Possibility of train rolls away | Wrong travel direction/intentional backward moving – combination of SPH08 and SPH14 | Wrong absolute/ relative position registered | Train detection failure | Loss of train integrity | Possible wrong route for train | Failure in transmission/communication of timetable/ MA | Guideway structural failure | Broken switch component | Wrong switch command | Wrong switch status | Sys- tem object on guideway/within CE excl. ballast | Foreign object on guideway/ within CE | Road traffi c user on LC | Slipstream effects on ballast | Aerodynamic forces impact on train Train equipment/ element/ loading infringes CE of train | Inappropriate CE dimension for train (wayside) | Wrong distribution of loading | Broken wheel, broken axle | Hot axle/ wheel/bearing | Failure of bogie/ suspension/damping | Failure of vehicle frame/ car body | Trespassing (security aspect) | Authorised person crosses track | Staff working on track | Unauthorised person intrudes track (negligences) | Possibility of person falling from platform edge onto track | Slipstream/ person too close to platform edge | Staff working near track e.g. neighboured track | Possibility of person leaving train intentionally (excl. PXCH) | Possibility of person falling out of (side) door | Possibility of person falling out of door onto wall Train on guideway infringes ist CE TR GW INFR CE Train equipment element/loading infringes CE of train TRN EQUIPM Moveable mirror Moveable ramp/ footstep Pantograph Rolling stock failure Train leaves/ rolls with open doors (uninfringed CE) | Possibility of person falling into gangway area between two cars | Possibility of passenger leaning out of door | Possibility of passenger leaning out of window | Staff/ train attendant leans out of door | Staff/ train attendant leans out of window | Shunting staff on vehicle leaning out from step | Possibility of person falling/climbing from platform into gap between vehicle and platform | Possibility of person falling out of/ leaving train without existence of platform | Possibility of person falls in door area at PXCH | Possibility of train doors closing with person in door area | Possibility of train moving during passenger exchange | Possibility of person hurt in train | Fire / explosion hazard (in/ at train) – accident category, Consequence of SPH55, SPH56 | Inappropriate temperature (in train) | Toxication/ asphyxiation (in/ at train) | Electrocution (in/ at train) | Person falls on platform (excl. PXCH) | Inappropriate temperature (on platform) | Toxication/ asphyxiation (on platform) | Electrocution (on platform) Train on guideway/ leaves CE (lateral, vertical, rolling movement TRN LEAN SIDEW Guideway structural failure LOAD EXCEED CE OPEN DOOR MIRROR MOV RAMP PANTOGRAPH RS: STRUC FAIL GW STRUC FAIL
Safety at passenger exchange 3 Prevention of slipping on platform 3 Gap protection measures 3 Dependence of door closing and train movement 3 Reverse of door closure 3 Locking of doors/ windows 3 Prevention of falling of person 3 Announcement of door closure 3 Limitation of kinetic energy during door closure 3 Detection of obstacle/ person in door and stoppage of door closing 3 Selective release of door locking /lighting of platform 3 Maintenance of RS (excl. barriers) 3 Maintenance of objects of infrastructure (excl. barriers) 3 Maintenance of platform and platform equipment Human attention 3 Human attention wayside staff 3 Human attention TD 3 Human attention (TD on LC) 3 Human attention: TD, knowledge of route & brake application 3 Human attention train attendant Route safety 3 One-directional track operation 3 Protection against entering track 3 Flank protection 3 Immobilisation of train 3 Track occupancy detection Abb. 4: Liste der Barrieren (Auszug) Abb. 5: Liste der Neutralisierenden Faktoren NF ROSA – Optimierende Sicherheitsanalyse System Bahn Single coach train | Marginal dimension and mass of object | Sufficient distance between CE and obstacle/ installation/ buildings | Suffi- cient distance between train gauge and object | Second rail keeps train guiding | (Broken) element keeps its position | Dispatcher sets up route for vehicles in order to minimise damages | Setup or route without conflicts | No flanking train | No head on train | No presence of maintenance train | No approach of (next) train | No presence of train | No preceding train | Low speed diffe- rence | Low speed on train | No standing vehicle Mitigation of toxic substances | No critical voltage impacts on person | No exposure of person in hazardous area | Human attention (passenger, third) | No person on platform | No passenger in train | (Self-) rescue of person | Passenger keeps sitting | No road user on LC | Road user leaves LC in time | Vehicle rolls out | Local staff stops vehicle | No switch command (no moving switch) | Trailable points | Track without catenary | Track without gradient | No obstacle on track | Sufficient radius of curvature | NF: adequate visi- bility conditions (climate, no dusk, …) Umsetzung des Modells in ein rechnergestütztes Werkzeug Ziele dieser Arbeiten sind: 3 Kopplung der Unfallereignisse mit generischen Gefährdungen als Ursache mithilfe von Ereignisbäumen 3 Schaffung einer rechnergestützten Matrixstruktur zur Verknüpfung von Eintretenswahrscheinlichkeiten von Gefährdungen und den Versagens- Train protection; safe movement of train 3 Overspeed protection 3 Speed limit indication 3 Protection against exceeding operational danger point 3 Speed restriction 3 Onboard survey of train integrity 3 Initial survey of train 3 Wayside survey of train systems 3 Onboard survey of train systems 3 Onboard hot box detection 3 Wayside hot box detection 3 Limitation of suspension 3 High mass of train 3 Discovery of train detection failure 3 Replication of train position 3 Disposition of train 3 Setup of safe route; Generation of MA (interlocking system) 3 Unambiguous transmission/ display of MA to train driver 3 Correct interpretation of transmitted MA 3 Dependence of routes/ signals/ route logic 3 Approach locking (incl. detection of train approach) 3 Time buffer according to train approach 3 Check of end position of switch Separation of road and track 3 Activation of train announcement on LC; separation of road user and train 3 Check of LC protection 3 LC monitoring Guiding function of track; compliance with clearance envelope 3 Broken rail detection 3 Detection of irregular track conditions 3 Supplementary guiding of wheel 3 Compliance with loading gauge and distribution of mass 3 Storm warning 3 Protection against crosswind sensibility 3 Detection of obstacle on track/ within CE Safe transportation of passenger and loading 3 Fixation of movable elements 3 Closure of dangerous zone 3 Isolation of heat source and environment 3 Control and supervision of temperature 3 Control of air mixture 3 Limitation of jerk 3 Permanently coupled cars 3 Compliance with regulations and rules concerning integrity of personal health Protection against intrusion of person into clearance envelope 3 Prevention of intrusion into CE (outside platform) 3 Prevention of intrusion into CE platform 3 Prevention of intrusion into dangerous area (platform edge) 3 Detection of intrusion into CE platform 3 Ensure safe crossings of track 3 Ensure (self-)rescue near CE 3 Trainside announcement of train approach 3 Wayside announcement of train approach 3 Announcement of train approach at platform 3 Announcement of train approach on closed track 3 Wayside recognisability of RS 3 Report of person on track and closure of track wahrscheinlichkeiten von Sicherheitseinrichtungen unter Berücksichtigung der Verzweigungs- wahrscheinlichkeiten (im Sinne der Aufteilungs- parameter) in den relevanten Ästen der Ereig- nisbäume 3 Erstellen der Datenstrukturen mit Berücksichtigung der Strukturen vorhandener Datenbanken 3 Erstellung von Schnittstellen zu Eingaben aller relevanten Parameter für MS-Excel-Anwendungen 13
Seite 1 und 2: Innovationspolitik, Informationsges
Seite 3 und 4: Innovationspolitik, Informationsges
Seite 5 und 6: Inhalt Verbundvorhaben „Regionalv
Seite 7 und 8: Schienenverkehr - sicher, leise, ef
Seite 9 und 10: Der Ideenwettbewerb umfasste drei K
Seite 11 und 12: künftigen Marktdurchdringung neuer
Seite 13: ROSA - Optimierende Sicherheitsanal
Seite 17 und 18: INTRAS III - Radsatzintegrierte Kö
Seite 19 und 20: Beschleunigung in m/s 2 INTRAS III
Seite 21 und 22: 3 wirtschaftliche Bewertung der Lö
Seite 23 und 24: B1 Rad/ Schiene-Kontakt Teilprojekt
Seite 25 und 26: „High Speed Grinding“ Schienenp
Seite 27 und 28: Abb. 2: Schleifzug RC 01 die DB auc
Seite 29 und 30: Das DURFLEX ® -Oberbausystem - ein
Seite 31 und 32: Christian Wörmann DB Netz Die Verk
Seite 33 und 34: einen zu regelnden Zug zunächst au
Seite 35 und 36: TaT - Neue Technologieansätze für
Seite 37 und 38: InnoCoupler - Rationelle Produktion
Seite 39 und 40: HL - Luftleitung für Gemischtluftk
Seite 41 und 42: 3 XPressTerminal Terminalabwicklung
Seite 43 und 44: Verbundvorhaben „Regionalverbund
Seite 45 und 46: Um dieser Entwicklung entgegenzutre
Seite 47 und 48: DemoOrt - Chancen und Risiken einer
Seite 49 und 50: Abb. 2: Versuchfahrzeug der AVG in
Seite 51 und 52: FlexCargoRail - Ohne Diesel in die
Seite 53 und 54: Traktionssteuerung/Bremssteuerung E
Seite 55 und 56: NeuPro Plus - Intelligente Schienen
Seite 57 und 58: NeuPro Plus - Intelligente Schienen
Seite 60: Diese Druckschrift wird im Rahmen d

Schienenverkehr – sicher, leise, effizient - (IRT) der RWTH Aachen

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