25.02.2013 Views

TCP/IP Tutorial and Technical Overview - IBM Redbooks

TCP/IP Tutorial and Technical Overview - IBM Redbooks

TCP/IP Tutorial and Technical Overview - IBM Redbooks

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

NAT is compute intensive even with the assistance of a sophisticated checksum<br />

adjustment algorithm, because each data packet is subject to NAT lookup <strong>and</strong><br />

modifications.<br />

It is m<strong>and</strong>atory that all requests <strong>and</strong> responses pertaining to a session be routed<br />

through the same router that is running the NAT service.<br />

Translation of outbound <strong>TCP</strong>/UDP fragments (that is, those originating from<br />

private hosts) in a NAPT setup will not work (refer to “Fragmentation” on<br />

page 104). This is because only the first fragment contains the <strong>TCP</strong>/UDP header<br />

that is necessary to associate the packet to a session for translation purposes.<br />

Subsequent fragments do not contain <strong>TCP</strong>/UDP port information, but simply<br />

carry the same fragmentation identifier specified in the first fragment. When the<br />

target host receives the two unrelated datagrams, carrying the same<br />

fragmentation ID <strong>and</strong> from the same assigned host address, it is unable to<br />

determine to which of the two sessions the datagrams belong. Consequently,<br />

both sessions will be corrupted.<br />

NAT changes some of the address information in an <strong>IP</strong> packet. This becomes an<br />

issue when <strong>IP</strong>Sec is used. Refer to 22.4, “<strong>IP</strong> Security Architecture (<strong>IP</strong>Sec)” on<br />

page 809 <strong>and</strong> 22.10, “Virtual private networks (VPNs) overview” on page 861.<br />

When end-to-end <strong>IP</strong>Sec authentication is used, a packet whose address has<br />

been changed will always fail its integrity check under the Authentication Header<br />

protocol, because any change to any bit in the datagram will invalidate the<br />

integrity check value that was generated by the source. Because <strong>IP</strong>Sec protocols<br />

offer some solutions to the addressing issues that were previously h<strong>and</strong>led by<br />

NAT, there is no need for NAT when all hosts that compose a given virtual<br />

private network use globally unique (public) <strong>IP</strong> addresses. Address hiding can be<br />

achieved by the <strong>IP</strong>Sec tunnel mode. If a company uses private addresses within<br />

its intranet, the <strong>IP</strong>Sec tunnel mode can keep them from ever appearing in<br />

cleartext from in the public Internet, which eliminates the need for NAT.<br />

3.1.8 Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR)<br />

St<strong>and</strong>ard <strong>IP</strong> routing underst<strong>and</strong>s only Class A, B, <strong>and</strong> C network addresses.<br />

Within each of these networks, subnetting can be used to provide better<br />

granularity. However, there is no way to specify that multiple Class C networks<br />

are related. The result of this is termed the routing table explosion problem: A<br />

Class B network of 3000 hosts requires one routing table entry at each backbone<br />

router. The same environment, if addressed as a range of Class C networks,<br />

requires 16 entries.<br />

The solution to this problem is called Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR).<br />

CIDR is described in RFCs 1518 to 1520. CIDR does not route according to the<br />

Chapter 3. Internetworking protocols 95

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!