MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences - Cryptome

organism (or system) is equivalent to the concept of being a
state of the organism (or system) that plays a certain causal
role R. It is claimed that the states that answer to the functional
concepts in question are invariably physical states, but
which physical states they are may vary from species to species,
or even within a species, perhaps even within a given
individual at different times.
Concerns about type epiphenomenalism remain, however.
We type intentional mental states not only by their
intentional mode (e.g., belief, desire, intention), but also by
their content (by what is believed, what is desired, or what is
intended). According to externalist theories of content, the
content of a mental state can fail to supervene on intrinsic
physical states of its occupant (Putnam 1975b; Burge 1979).
Two intrinsic physical duplicates could have mental states
(e.g., beliefs) with different contents. Thus intentional state
types seem to involve contextual, environmental factors.
The concern is that the contextual, environmental component
of content is causally irrelevant to behavior. This is a
problem in that the contents of beliefs and desires figure
essentially in belief-desire explanations of behavior. The
problem is exacerbated by the fact that on some externalist
theories, content depends on historical context (Dretske
1988), and that on some it can depend on social context
(Burge 1979).
A concern also remains about whether qualitative mental
states (states that have a subjective experiential aspect) are
epiphenomena. Our concepts of sensory states—e.g., aches,
pains, itches, and the like—are arguably not functional concepts
in either sense of functional concepts (Hill 1991). This
has led some philosophers to embrace token dualism for
such states and to maintain both type and token epiphenomenalism
for them (Jackson 1982; Chalmers 1996). In rejection
of epiphenomenalism for qualitative states, some
philosophers argue that sensory concepts are equivalent to
functional concepts (White 1991). And some argue that
although sensory concepts are not equivalent to functional
concepts or physical concepts, nonetheless, sensory properties
are identical with neural properties (Hill 1991).
Whether PHYSICALISM is true for sensory states raises the
mind-body problem in perhaps its toughest form. That a
nagging headache can cause one to be in a bad mood and
that an itch can cause one to scratch seem to be as intuitive
cases of mental causation as one can find. But how, and
indeed even whether, a qualitative aspect of a mental state
(e.g., the achiness of the headache) can be causally relevant
remains an issue of intense debate.
See also INDIVIDUALISM; MENTAL CAUSATION; MENTAL
REPRESENTATION; NARROW CONTENT
—Brian P. McLaughlin
References
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Further Readings
Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.