MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences - Cryptome

840 Theory of Mind
argued for a “simulation” theory of many theory of mind
developments. On this view advances in the child’s understanding
of the mind reflect an increasing ability to simulate
or imagine the experiences of others. Dunn suggests that
socialization and social interaction may play a crucial role in
children’s development of a theory of mind (Dunn et al.
1991). In support of this view, there is evidence that younger
siblings have a more advanced theory of mind than older
siblings (Perner, Ruffman, and Leekam 1994) and that parent’s
conversations about mental states influence children’s
understanding of the mind (Dunn et al. 1991). Probably the
most widely held view, however, is what has been called
“the theory theory” (Perner 1991; Wellman 1990; Gopnik
1993; Flavell, Green, and Flavell 1995). Originally advanced
in philosophy (see SIMULATION VS. THEORY-THEORY) this
view also is part of a more general theoretical approach that
explains children’s COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT by analogy to
scientific theory change (Carey 1985; Gopnik and Meltzoff
1997; Wellman 1990). On this view children develop a succession
of theories of the mind that they use to explain their
experience and the behavior of themselves and others. Like
scientific theories, these intuitive or naive theories postulate
abstract coherent mental entities and laws, and they provide
predictions, interpretations, and explanations. The theories
change as children confront counterevidence, gather new
data, and perform experiments. One consequence of this
view is that the philosophical doctrine of first-person authority
is incorrect; our knowledge of our minds is as theoretical
as our knowledge of the minds of others. More broadly, the
recent research suggests that empirical evidence from developmental
psychology may be brought to bear on classic
problems in the philosophy of mind.
See also CONCEPTUAL CHANGE; MACHIAVELLIAN INTELLI-
GENCE HYPOTHESIS; NATIVISM; PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
—Alison Gopnik
References and Further Readings
Astington, P., L. Harris, and D. R. Olson, Eds. (1988). Developing
Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Bartsch, K., and H. M. Wellman. (1989). Young children’s attribution
of action to beliefs and desires. Child Development 60(4):
946–964.
Bartsch, K., and H. M. Wellman. (1995). Children Talk about the
Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Butterworth, G. (1991). The ontogeny and phylogeny of joint
visual attention. In A. Whiten, Ed., Natural Theories of Mind:
Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading.
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 223–232.
Byrne, R., and A. Whiten, Eds. (1988). Machiavellian Intelligence:
Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys,
Apes and Humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Campos, J. J., and C. R. Sternberg. (1980). Perception, appraisal
and emotion: The onset of social referencing. In M. Lamb and
L. Sherrod, Eds., Infant Social Cognition. Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum, pp. 273–311.
Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual Change in Childhood. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Carruthers, P., and P. Smith, Eds. (1995). Theories of Theory of
Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chandler, M. J., and D. Helm. (1984). Developmental changes in
the contribution of shared experience to social role-taking competence.
International Journal of Behavioral Development 7:
145–156.
Clements, W., and J. Perner. (1994). Implicit understanding of
belief. Cognitive Development 9: 377–395.
Dunn, J., J. Brown, C. Slomkowski, C. Tesla, and L. Youngblade.
(1991). Young children’s understanding of other people’s feelings
and beliefs: Individual differences and their antecedents.
Child Development 62: 1352–1366.
Flavell, J. H., E. R. Flavell, F. L. Green, and L. J. Moses. (1990).
Young children’s understanding of fact beliefs versus value
beliefs. Child Development 61(4): 915–928.
Flavell, J. H., F. L. Green, and E. R. Flavell. (1986). Development
of knowledge about the appearance-reality distinction. Monographs
of the Society for Research in Child Development 51,
no. 1.
Flavell, J. H., F. L. Green, and E. R. Flavell. (1995). Young children’s
knowledge about thinking. Monographs of the Society
for Research in Child Development, serial no. 243.
Gopnik, A. (1993). How we know our minds: The illusion of firstperson
knowledge of intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
16: 1–14.
Gopnik, A., and J. W. Astington. (1988). Children’s understanding
of representational change and its relation to the understanding
of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction. Child
Development 59: 26–37.
Gopnik, A., and A. N. Meltzoff. (1997). Words, Thoughts and Theories.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gopnik, A., A. N. Meltzoff, and V. Slaughter. (1994). Changing
your views: How understanding visual perception can lead to a
new theory of the mind. In C. Lewis and P. Mitchell, Eds., Origins
of a Theory of Mind. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Harris, P. L. (1989). Children and Emotion. Oxford: Blackwell.
Harris, P. L. (1991). The work of the imagination. In A. Whiten,
Ed., Natural Theories of Mind: The Evolution, Development
and Simulation of Second-Order Mental Representations.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Harris, P. L., and R. Kavanaugh. (1993). Young children’s understanding
of pretense. Monographs of the Society for Research
in Child Development 58: 1.
Leslie, A. M. (1994). ToMM, To By, and agency: Core architecture
and domain specificity. In L. Hirschfield and S. Gelman, Eds.,
Mapping the mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Masangkay, Z., K. McCluskey, C. McIntyre, J. Sims-Knight, B.
Vaughan, and J. H. Flavell. (1974). The early development of
inferences about the visual percepts of others. Child Development
45: 357–366.
Meltzoff, A. N., and A. Gopnik. (1993). The role of imitation in
understanding persons and developing a theory of mind. In S.
Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and D. Cohen, Eds., Understanding
Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 335–366.
Meltzoff, A. N., and M. K. Moore. (1977). Imitation of facial and
manual gestures by human neonates. Science 198: 75–78.
Mitchell, P., and H. Lacohee. (1991). Children’s early understanding
of false belief. Cognition 39(2).
Moses, L. J. (1993). Young children’s understanding of belief constraints
on intention. Cognitive Development, pp. 1–27.
Nisbett, R., and L. Ross. (1980). Human Inference: Strategies and
Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
O’Neill, D. K., and A. Gopnik. (1991). Young children’s ability to
identify the sources of their beliefs. Developmental Psychology
27: 390–397.