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MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences - Cryptome

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etween <strong>the</strong> agent and <strong>the</strong> world (see INFORMATIONAL SE-<br />

MANTICS). One may explain <strong>the</strong> content <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> representational<br />

states <strong>of</strong> an agent in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> way those states tend<br />

to vary systematically in response to states <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> environment.<br />

A state <strong>of</strong> a person or thing carries <strong>the</strong> information<br />

that P if <strong>the</strong> person or thing is in <strong>the</strong> state because <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> fact<br />

that P, and would not be in <strong>the</strong> state if it were not <strong>the</strong> case<br />

that P. The strategy is to explain <strong>the</strong> content <strong>of</strong> representational<br />

states in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> information that <strong>the</strong> states tend<br />

to carry, or <strong>the</strong> information that <strong>the</strong> states would carry if<br />

<strong>the</strong>y were functioning properly, or if conditions were normal.<br />

The information <strong>the</strong>oretic strategy will give determinate<br />

content to representational states only relative to some<br />

specification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> relevant normal conditions. A central<br />

task <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> development and defense <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> information<strong>the</strong>oretic<br />

strategy is to give an account <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se conditions.<br />

A third strategy—<strong>the</strong> linguistic strategy—is to begin<br />

with linguistic representation, and to explain <strong>the</strong> content <strong>of</strong><br />

mental states in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> content <strong>of</strong> sentences that realize<br />

<strong>the</strong> mental states, or <strong>of</strong> sentences to which <strong>the</strong> agent is<br />

disposed to assent. One version <strong>of</strong> this strategy, defended by<br />

Jerry Fodor (1987) among o<strong>the</strong>rs, assumes that propositional<br />

attitudes are realized by <strong>the</strong> storage (in <strong>the</strong> “belief<br />

box,” to use <strong>the</strong> popular metaphor) <strong>of</strong> sentences <strong>of</strong> a LAN-<br />

GUAGE OF THOUGHT. Ano<strong>the</strong>r version takes a social practice<br />

<strong>of</strong> speech as primary, accounting for <strong>the</strong> contents <strong>of</strong> beliefs<br />

in terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> contents <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sentences <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> public language<br />

that <strong>the</strong> agent “holds true,” or to which <strong>the</strong> agent is<br />

disposed to assent. Donald Davidson (1984) has defended<br />

this kind <strong>of</strong> strategy (see RADICAL INTERPRETATION). The<br />

first version <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> linguistic strategy needs a distinction<br />

between explicit or “core” beliefs and implicit beliefs,<br />

because it would not be plausible to say that everything<br />

believed is explicitly stored. The second version has a problem<br />

explaining attitudes with content that is not easily<br />

expressed in linguistic form (for example, perceptual<br />

states), and it seems to conflict with <strong>the</strong> intuition that<br />

thought without <strong>the</strong> capacity for speech is at least a possibility.<br />

Both accounts need to be supplemented with some<br />

account <strong>of</strong> what it is in virtue <strong>of</strong> which <strong>the</strong> relevant kind <strong>of</strong><br />

linguistic representations have content.<br />

See also COMPOSITIONALITY; FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; GRICE;<br />

INTENTIONAL STANCE; MEANING<br />

—Robert Stalnaker<br />

References and Fur<strong>the</strong>r Readings<br />

Barwise, J., and J. Perry. (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge,<br />

MA: <strong>MIT</strong> Press.<br />

Burge, T. (1978). Individualism and <strong>the</strong> mental. Midwest Studies in<br />

Philosophy, 4, Studies in Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University<br />

<strong>of</strong> Minnesota Press.<br />

Crimmins, M. (1992). Talk about Belief. Cambridge, MA: <strong>MIT</strong><br />

Press.<br />

Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation.<br />

Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />

Dennett, D. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: <strong>MIT</strong><br />

Press.<br />

Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining Behavior. Cambridge, MA: <strong>MIT</strong><br />

Press.<br />

Field, H. (1978). Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13: 9–61.<br />

Prosody and Intonation 679<br />

Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem <strong>of</strong> Meaning in<br />

Psychology <strong>of</strong> Mind. Cambridge, MA: <strong>MIT</strong> Press.<br />

Quine, W. V. (1956). Quantifiers and propositional attitudes. Journal<br />

<strong>of</strong> Philosophy 53: 177–187.<br />

Richard, M. (1990). Propositional Attitudes. Cambridge: Cambridge<br />

University Press.<br />

Salmon, N., and S. Soames, Eds. (1982). Propositional Attitudes.<br />

Oxford: Oxford University Press.<br />

Stalnaker, R. (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: <strong>MIT</strong> Press.<br />

Stich, S. (1983). From Folk Psychology to <strong>Cognitive</strong> Science: The<br />

Case Against Belief. Cambridge, MA: <strong>MIT</strong> Press.<br />

Proprioception<br />

See AFFORDANCES; I<strong>MIT</strong>ATION; SELF; SENSATIONS<br />

Prosody and Intonation<br />

The term prosody refers to <strong>the</strong> grouping and relative prominence<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> elements making up <strong>the</strong> speech signal. One<br />

reflex <strong>of</strong> prosody is <strong>the</strong> perceived rhythm <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> speech. Prosodic<br />

structure may be described formally by a hierarchical<br />

structure in which <strong>the</strong> smallest units are <strong>the</strong> internal components<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> syllable and <strong>the</strong> largest is <strong>the</strong> intonation phrase.<br />

Units <strong>of</strong> intermediate scale include <strong>the</strong> syllable, <strong>the</strong> metrical<br />

foot, and <strong>the</strong> prosodic word (Selkirk 1984; Hayes 1995).<br />

Intonation refers to phrase-level characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

melody <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> voice. Intonation is used by speakers to mark<br />

<strong>the</strong> pragmatic force <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> information in an utterance. The<br />

alignment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> intonation contour with <strong>the</strong> words is constrained<br />

by <strong>the</strong> prosody, with intonational events falling on<br />

<strong>the</strong> most prominent elements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> prosodic structure and<br />

at <strong>the</strong> edges. As a result, intonational events can <strong>of</strong>ten provide<br />

information to <strong>the</strong> listener about <strong>the</strong> prosodic structure,<br />

in addition to carrying a pragmatic message. The term intonation<br />

is <strong>of</strong>ten used, by extension, to refer to systematic<br />

characteristics <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> voice melody at larger scales, such as<br />

<strong>the</strong> discourse segment or <strong>the</strong> paragraph (Beckman and<br />

Pierrehumbert 1986; Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg 1990;<br />

Ladd 1996).<br />

The primary phonetic correlate <strong>of</strong> intonation is <strong>the</strong> fundamental<br />

frequency <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> voice (F0), which is perceived as<br />

pitch and which arises from <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> vibration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> vocal<br />

folds. The F0 is determined by <strong>the</strong> configuration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> larynx,<br />

<strong>the</strong> subglottal pressure, and <strong>the</strong> degree <strong>of</strong> oral closure<br />

(Clark and Yallop 1990; Titze 1994). Articulatory maneuvers<br />

that change <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong> vibration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> vocal folds also<br />

affect <strong>the</strong> exact shape <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> glottal waveform and hence <strong>the</strong><br />

voice timbre (or voice quality). Perceived voice quality is<br />

probably used in perception to assist in <strong>the</strong> identification <strong>of</strong><br />

intonation patterns (Pierrehumbert 1997). Intonation is not<br />

<strong>the</strong> only source <strong>of</strong> F0 variation. Speech segments also have<br />

systematic effects on F0. However, <strong>the</strong> largest segmental<br />

effects are on <strong>the</strong> time-frequency scale <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> smaller intonational<br />

effects. Thus, F0 contours can be roughly viewed<br />

as a superposition <strong>of</strong> segmental factors on <strong>the</strong> intonationally<br />

determined contour.<br />

Many experimental studies show that prosody affects all<br />

aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> speech signal (see Papers in Laboratory

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