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MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences - Cryptome

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688 Psycholinguistics<br />

Glymour, C. (1992). Freud’s androids. In J. Neu, Ed., The Cambridge<br />

Companion to Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University<br />

Press.<br />

Grunbaum, A. (1984). The Foundations <strong>of</strong> Psychoanalysis: A<br />

Philosophical Critique. Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> California<br />

Press.<br />

Grunbaum, A. (1993). Validation in <strong>the</strong> Clinical Theory <strong>of</strong> Psychoanalysis.<br />

Madison, CT: International Universities Press.<br />

Hinshelwood, R. D. (1990). A Dictionary <strong>of</strong> Kleinian Thought.<br />

London: Free Associations Books.<br />

Hopkins, J. (1997). Psychoanalysis, post-Freudian. In E. Craig,<br />

Ed., The Routledge Encyclopaedia <strong>of</strong> Philosophy. London:<br />

Routledge.<br />

Hopkins, J. (1998). Freud and <strong>the</strong> science <strong>of</strong> mind. In S. Glendinning,<br />

Ed., The Edinburgh Encyclopaedia <strong>of</strong> Continental Philosophy.<br />

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.<br />

Kitcher, P. (1992). Freud’s Dream: A Complete Interdisciplinary<br />

Science <strong>of</strong> Mind. Cambridge, MA: <strong>MIT</strong> Press.<br />

Kline, P. (1984). Psychology and Freudian Theory: An Introduction.<br />

London: Methuen.<br />

Lear, J. (1990). Love and Its Place in Nature. New York: Farrar,<br />

Strauss, and Giroux.<br />

MacDonald, C., and D. MacDonald, Eds. (1995). Philosophy <strong>of</strong><br />

Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford:<br />

Blackwell.<br />

Masson, J., Ed. (1985). The Complete Letters <strong>of</strong> Sigmund Freud to<br />

Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University<br />

Press.<br />

Moore, B., and B. Fine. (1990). Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts.<br />

New Haven: Yale University Press.<br />

Neu, J. (1992). The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge:<br />

Cambridge University Press.<br />

Wollheim, R. (1991). Freud. 2nd ed. London: Fontana.<br />

Wollheim, R. (1994). The Mind and its Depths. Cambridge, MA:<br />

Harvard University Press.<br />

Psycholinguistics<br />

Psycholinguistics is <strong>the</strong> study <strong>of</strong> people’s actions and mental<br />

processes as <strong>the</strong>y use language. At its core are speaking<br />

and listening, which have been studied in domains as different<br />

as LANGUAGE ACQUISITION and language disorders. Yet<br />

<strong>the</strong> primary domain <strong>of</strong> psycholinguistics is everyday language<br />

use.<br />

Speaking and listening have several levels. At <strong>the</strong> bottom<br />

are <strong>the</strong> perceptible sounds and gestures <strong>of</strong> language: how<br />

speakers produce <strong>the</strong>m, and how listeners hear, see, and<br />

identify <strong>the</strong>m (see PHONETICS, PHONOLOGY, SIGN LAN-<br />

GUAGES). One level up are <strong>the</strong> words, gestural signals, and<br />

syntactic arrangement <strong>of</strong> what is uttered: how speakers formulate<br />

utterances, and how listeners identify <strong>the</strong>m (see<br />

SENTENCE PROCESSING). At <strong>the</strong> next level up are communicative<br />

acts: what speakers do with <strong>the</strong>ir utterances, and how<br />

listeners understand what <strong>the</strong>y mean (see PRAGMATICS). At<br />

<strong>the</strong> highest level is DISCOURSE, <strong>the</strong> joint activities people<br />

engage in as <strong>the</strong>y use language. At each level, speakers and<br />

listeners have to coordinate <strong>the</strong>ir actions.<br />

Speakers plan what <strong>the</strong>y say more than one word at a<br />

time. In conversation and spontaneous narratives, <strong>the</strong>y tend<br />

to plan in intonation units, generally a single major clause<br />

or phrase delivered under a unifying intonation contour<br />

(Chafe 1980). Intonation units take time to plan, so <strong>the</strong>y<br />

<strong>of</strong>ten begin with pauses and disfluencies (uh or um, elongated<br />

words, repeated words). For example, one speaker<br />

recounting a film said: “[1.0 sec pause] A--nd u--m [2.6 sec<br />

pause] you see him taking . . . picking <strong>the</strong> pears <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong><br />

leaves.”<br />

Planning such units generally proceeds from <strong>the</strong> top level<br />

<strong>of</strong> language down—from intention to ARTICULATION (Levelt<br />

1989). Speakers decide on a message, <strong>the</strong>n choose constructions<br />

for expressing it, and finally program <strong>the</strong> phonetic<br />

segments for articulating it. They do this in overlapping<br />

stages.<br />

Formulation starts at a functional level. Consider a<br />

woman planning “Take <strong>the</strong> steaks out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> freezer.” First<br />

she chooses <strong>the</strong> subject, verb, direct object, and source she<br />

wants to express, roughly “<strong>the</strong> addressee is to get meat from<br />

a freezer.” Then she chooses an appropriate syntactic frame,<br />

an imperative construction with a verb, object, and source<br />

location. She <strong>the</strong>n finds <strong>the</strong> noun and verbs she needs, take,<br />

steak, and freeze. Finally, she fills in <strong>the</strong> necessary syntactic<br />

elements—<strong>the</strong> article <strong>the</strong>, <strong>the</strong> preposition out <strong>of</strong>, and <strong>the</strong> suffixes<br />

-s and -er. Formulation <strong>the</strong>n proceeds to a positional<br />

level. She creates a phonetic plan for what she has formulated<br />

so far. She uses <strong>the</strong> plan to program her articulatory<br />

organs (tongue, lips, glottis) to produce <strong>the</strong> actual sounds,<br />

“Take <strong>the</strong> steaks out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> freezer.” Processing at <strong>the</strong>se levels<br />

overlaps as she plans later phrases while articulating earlier<br />

ones.<br />

Much <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> evidence for <strong>the</strong>se stages comes from slips<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tongue collected over <strong>the</strong> past century (Fromkin<br />

1973; Garrett 1980). Suppose that <strong>the</strong> speaker <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> last<br />

example had, by mistake, transposed steak and freeze as she<br />

introduced <strong>the</strong>m. She would <strong>the</strong>n have added -s to freeze<br />

and -er to steak and produced “Take <strong>the</strong> freezes out <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

steaker.” O<strong>the</strong>r slips occur at <strong>the</strong> positional level, as when<br />

<strong>the</strong> initial sounds in left hemisphere are switched to form<br />

heft lemisphere.<br />

Listeners are <strong>of</strong>ten thought to work from <strong>the</strong> bottom up.<br />

They are assumed to start with <strong>the</strong> sounds <strong>the</strong>y hear, infer<br />

<strong>the</strong> words and syntax <strong>of</strong> an utterance, and, finally, infer what<br />

<strong>the</strong> speakers meant. The actual picture is more complicated.<br />

In everyday conversation, listeners have a good idea <strong>of</strong> what<br />

speakers are trying to do, and working top down, <strong>the</strong>y use<br />

this information to help <strong>the</strong>m identify and understand what<br />

<strong>the</strong>y hear (Tanenhaus and Trueswell 1995).<br />

Spoken utterances are identified from left to right by an<br />

incremental process <strong>of</strong> elimination (Marslen-Wilson 1987).<br />

As listeners take in <strong>the</strong> sounds <strong>of</strong> “elephant,” for example,<br />

<strong>the</strong>y narrow down <strong>the</strong> words it might be. They start with an<br />

initial cohort <strong>of</strong> all words beginning with “e” (roughly 1000<br />

words), narrow that to <strong>the</strong> cohort <strong>of</strong> all words beginning with<br />

“el” (roughly 100 words), and so on. By <strong>the</strong> sound “f” <strong>the</strong><br />

cohort contains only one word, allowing <strong>the</strong>m to identify <strong>the</strong><br />

word as “elephant.” This way listeners <strong>of</strong>ten identify a word<br />

before it is complete. Evidence also suggests that listeners<br />

access all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> meanings <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> words in <strong>the</strong>se cohorts<br />

(Swinney 1979). For example, <strong>the</strong> moment <strong>the</strong>y identify<br />

“bugs” in “He found several bugs in <strong>the</strong> corner <strong>of</strong> his room”<br />

<strong>the</strong>y activate <strong>the</strong> two meanings “insects” and “hidden microphones.”<br />

Remarkably, <strong>the</strong>y activate <strong>the</strong> same two meanings<br />

in “He found several spiders, roaches, and o<strong>the</strong>r bugs in <strong>the</strong>

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