Rousseau and Revolution

Arbitrariness and Freedom 65
historical implication of Rousseau’s principle. The claim that the French
Revolution – and the Jacobin movement in particular – was inspired by
Rousseau and, more generally, was the product of the French Enlightenment
is not new and has been repeated (or alternatively refuted) from early
on in different versions. What is distinctive, however, in Hegel’s judgement
is the claim that given Rousseau’s philosophical premises the revolution is a
necessary historical consequence – a consequence by no means avoidable.
The avoidable mistake is philosophical and lies on Rousseau’s side, not on
the side of the revolution (as Burke, for example, suggests).
The aim of this article is to answer some questions raised by Hegel’s aforementioned
two judgements on Rousseau. Why does Hegel view Rousseau as
defending a merely individual conception of the will when he so forcefully
upholds the universality of the general will? How does this judgement relate
to the claim that the revolution is the direct and necessary political consequence
of Rousseau’s theory – or what is it exactly in Rousseau’s conception
of the will that is deemed responsible for the revolution?
I examine fi rst the argument of the Phenomenology and then turn to the
Philosophy of Right. I argue that Hegel’s critique is animated by the recognition
of the common project of reducing the impact of the will’s arbitrariness
within the state. It is precisely on the basis of its unresolved arbitrariness that
Rousseau’s general will appears to Hegel only individual. For Hegel the
French Revolution is the historical manifestation of the arbitrariness that
Rousseau’s general will is unable to master. I suggest that Hegel’s own solution
of the problem lies in the concept of ‘civil society’. As Hegel displaces
the arbitrariness of Rousseau’s general will from the state to civil society he
overcomes the risk of the state’s revolutionary collapse. In fact, as Hegel’s
political model corrects the revolutionary implications of Rousseau’s state, it
proposes itself as the basis of a new dialectical relation between philosophy
and revolution. It will be Marx’s task to bring this connection to light, as civil
society becomes the stage of the revolutionary tensions of the new century.
In what follows, I read Rousseau through Hegel. Ultimately, my claim is
that Rousseau’s problem is Hegel’s problem. The French Revolution divides
them – but revolution, as an always-present possibility and an always-resurging
risk offers, again, the common ground for their refl ection.
Rousseau’s Legacy: The Phenomenology of Revolution
In the Phenomenology chapter ‘Absolute Freedom and Terror’ Hegel connects
in one dramatic narrative the Social Contract and the French Revolution. 3 He