Rousseau and Revolution

Why Rousseau Mistrusts Revolutions 29
Corsican and Polish insurrections, as well as in his writings which supported
the Genevans who contested the usurpation by the Little Council.
However, one should never ignore how, in these three cases, he carefully
examined the moral and cultural situation of the peoples in question before
engaging himself on their side. He writes, the Polish people ‘dares to call
for a government and laws, as if it had only just been born. It is in chains,
and debates the ways to remain free! It feels in itself the kind of force which
the force of tyranny cannot subjugate’ (ibid., 178). Rousseau infers that ‘in
a State like Poland [ . . . ], souls still have great resilience’ (ibid., 218). In
effect, the Poles ‘have just given a forever memorable example’ of ‘the love
of fatherland and of freedom animated by the virtues inseparable from that
love’ (ibid., 238). The specifi c nature of the Corsican and Polish insurrections,
their organized and almost institutional forms, as well as the moral
dispositions to discipline and courage manifested, forbid considering these
insurrections as informal and anarchic mutinies. Based on his faith in these
initial empirical proofs, Rousseau decides to move from theory to practice,
putting his wisdom in the service of political freedom:
I believed myself to be speaking to a people which, while not free of vices,
still had some resilience and virtues, and on that assumption my project
is a good one. But if Poland is already at the point where everything is
venal and rotten to the core, then it is in vain that it seeks to reform its law
and to preserve its freedom, it has to renounce doing so and bow its head
to the yoke. (Ibid., 242)
Perhaps more than any other author, Rousseau exhorts us to change the
world as it now exists. But he does it in his own special way. He brings about
a revolution within the philosophical revolution of modernity. If the revolution
of modern political philosophy is characterized by the belief in the
necessary advent of democracies, Rousseau seems to be a conservative
applying the brakes to such enthusiastic ardor. In reality, he is only conservative
in the sense that this belief in democracy necessitates for him, as a
precondition, a moral revolution. Such a contribution to modern revolutionary
thought is, as we might say, anti-modern. It constitutes a reminder
of forgotten lessons taught by the republics of ancient history. The revolution
which Rousseau operates within modern revolutionary thought must
thus be understood in the fi rst sense of the word ‘revolution,’ that is to say,
a return to an earlier situation, a closing of a circle. This is the sense in
which his teaching is revolutionary for us moderns. Nurtured by the lessons
of ancient history, he reminds us of what we most often refuse to