Rousseau and Revolution

102 Rousseau and Revolution
it is impossible to gather together the entire ‘people’ on a regular basis in
order to discuss the laws of the republic. Thus, in his proposition for a reformation
of the government of Poland, he admits that ‘the legislative power
cannot show itself as such, and can act only by delegation’ (Rousseau, 1997a,
200–1). True, Rousseau endeavours to limit the power of the Polish diet by
means of imperative mandates and a frequent renewal of the representatives
(ibid., 201). The fact remains, however, that he betrays his critique of
political representation as soon as he makes a proposition for a concrete
political structure.
Does this mean that one should simply reject Rousseau’s critique of political
representation? From a strictly philosophical point of view, one would
have the right to do so. However, as we are dealing here with the different
uses of Rousseau, it should be noted that this critique has actually played a
part in political history despite the impossibility of its institutional implementation.
For instance, as James Swenson points out, this critique was
invoked by different political orators during the entire French Revolution
(Swenson, 2000, 194–225).
Speaking of insurrection, it is of particular interest that, if also popular
movements during the revolution had a link to Rousseauism, this can be
seen as a direct consequence of Rousseau’s critique of representation. As
Swenson puts it, although these movements ‘seldom show the direct imprint
of Rousseau’s language’, they ‘can be seen to be largely compatible with the
construction of Rousseau’s doctrine that centers on the inalienability of
sovereignty’ (ibid., 217), in particular, the critique of representation. In
fact, Rousseau’s assertion that ‘the instant a People gives itself Representatives,
it ceases to be free; it ceases to be’ (Rousseau, 1997e, 115) could be
understood less as a defence of a certain political system, namely a system
without representation, than as a de-legitimization of every political system,
given that, as we have seen, no political system without representation is
possible. In other words, Rousseau’s critique of political representation can
be used to legitimate any revolt at any time.
It should, therefore, be clear how the concept of the general will can
serve as a legitimation of insurrection: Sovereignty, that is to say, ‘the exercise
of the general will’, is inalienable, and therefore political representation
is illegitimate. At the same time, political representation is unavoidable,
and, therefore, insurrections are always legitimate. True, such a radical
anarchist reading of Rousseau might seem a bit far-fetched; the point is,
however, that it is a possible reading which has operated, although rarely
explicitly, in different collective imaginations.