I Fiance Apicultural

Figure 1-Continued
16
Sources: Brake et al.1971; Donald 1976; Pakistan, Government of, 1974; Kato 1966,
1984; D. 1.Lee 198-1; Malik 1989; Reserve Bank of India 1992.
Notes: For Japan, institutional loans are from special banks, ordinary commercial
banks, insurance companies, individual cooperative associations (agricultural
cooplerative associations), simplified government ilsuraitc system, and governnlent;
for the Republic of Korea. from agricihmtal coopeiatives, rural
banks, comoniercial banks, nmutial savings and loan banks, credit associatiois,
attd insurance collima Iies; for Taiwan, fom goverinent-owne banks, agricultural
cOoleratives. and failters' associations; folThailand, from goverlllitelitowned
banks, agriculral cooperatives/fariltels' ssociations. commnercial
banks, iuttal savings and luoa banks, ciedit associations, and insurance coimpanies;
for the Philippines, from government, govcrnment-owned banks, and
rural banks; for India, fiom agricutiural cooperatives, n:iiomtalized commercial
banks, and regional rural batnks; for Pakistan, f|oni govelintent and governand
Sri Lanka, from govetinment-owned
nent-owned banks; and for Nepal
banks, agricultural cooperatives, anid commeircial banks.
For Japan, noninstittitional loans are frloin individual moneylenders, pawn
shops, merchants, loan companies, mnutual saving associations, and individuals;
for the Republic of Korea, fiom professionial illonieyleindels, relatives, friends.
informal groups, individuals, kye, traders and nltmeclranits, agriculturalists, and
itliilfacillels alldpilocessots; for l'aiwan, fronm Illechallts. ilnfollmal glollps,
1h0,individuals, and others; fboThailand and the Phhilippines, fronm landlords,
merchants, piofessionl toncylendels, and inldividitals; for India, fromi agriciil­
tilllal inoneltclideis, piofessiotial tonevlenders, timrcrs and conimission
agents, landlords aind icianis, and relatives; aind for 'akistan, Nepal, and Sri
Lanka, fronm landlords, iechatits, plofessional iioiyleldels, iawi shops,
and individuals.
loans increases withlieh inciease inop)portiities to iaise per capita real
national income and espleci:lly til incoeie within a given region. This
is foulnd foi" Stlb-Sahaiaii Afican LICs (7 p)erCent) versus MICs (40
percent), as well as for Soith Asian LICs (20 peicent) versus Southeast
Asian MICs (H1 )ercent) verstis Asiats I lTCs (86 percent).
The shalt of itistittoliollal i.alis across countiries Ilid regions is
positively associated with Ile oppotunitics to raise per capita real
national incoie and institt ional devclopltlcit. This follows from tle
copiarison of these sharcs aitiong Afiican Ll(]s (7 )etclcnt), Asian LICs
(20 peicent), Asian MICs ('IH per'ct), an Asian [IC (86 percent), Near-
East and Mediterranean Basin MICs ('19 )erceit), Liatin Anmican and
the Caiihhean MICs (70-96 percent),' and a North Anericai HIC (over
75 percent). The very small shares of noninstitutional loans in some
Latin Ancrtican and (aribhcan counties is perhaps (luc to the lack of a
tradition of informal tnoneylentding in these contitries.
5 Thte extremely high share of RFIs in latin Ainerica and the Caribbean nay iot be
in that
interpreted to suggest that RFls have leached a larger propoitioni of farmers
region. It fact, this is not the case, as will lie shown in tile next chapter. Nor is it true that
these count ries have lower traisaction costs, as willIe shown illClhapter 5.