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countries through CC-5 accounts. Alone in October 2002, preceding the general
elections in Brazil, the remittances amounted to 1.725 billion US-dollars. In the first
nine months of 2003 the CC-5 accounts had reached a negative balance of 1.3 billion
US-dollars. 296
The only restriction on the principally free transfer of capital and profits to foreign
countries made by the Brazilian legislation is in the case of severe difficulties with the
balance of payments.
The former Brazilian government, governo FHC 297 , had put up far-reaching demands
within the framework of the GATS-2000 negotiation round, which aimed at
applying the WTO rules of national treatment to public subsidies. 298 This fits into the
image, that the Cardoso government also liberalized the educational sector, which is
not explicitly mentioned in the positive list of the services sector. The Lei de Diretrizes
e Bases (LDB), which allows profit-oriented operating of the “ensino superior”, the
universities, was passed by the then Secretary of Education Paulo Renato Souza in
1997. 299 This opening up of markets to foreign investors and the progressive privatization
of the university educational system are in-line with the year-long demands
296 “As contas CC-5, utilizadas para remessas de dinheiro para o exterior e vice-versa, registraram saldo negativo de
US$ 1,3 bilhão nos nove primeiros meses do ano. No ano passado, US$ 9,107 bilhões foram mandados para o
exterior por meio das CC-5. Só em outubro de 2002, as remessas chegaram a atingir US$ 1,725 bilhão, quando
o país passava por uma crise de confiança em razão das eleições presidenciais.” Agência Brasil, October 8, 2003.
Own translation: “The CC-5 accounts used to send money abroad or vice-versa have registered a negative balance
of 1.3 billion US-dollars during the first nine months of this year. Last year, 9.107 billion US-dollars were transferred
abroad through CC-5 accounts. Alone in October 2002, the money sent amounted to 1.725 billion US-dollars,
when the country was passing through a crisis of confidence due to the presidential elections.”
297 FHC: Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazilian president 1995-2002.
298 “Os documentos das negociações com o GATS indicam que o governo brasileiro liderado pelo presidente
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, antes de deixar o posto, decidiu-se por posições mais agressivas que as de qualquer
membro da OMC quanto à questão da liberalização de serviços. Em seus pedidos formais de negociação, o
Brasil investiu contra os subsídios para programas públicos e defendeu abertamente a eliminação de isenções
concedidas a monopólios e setor público. Na medida em que as diretrizes para as negociações formais prestigiam
as solicitações de barganha apresentadas pelos países em desenvolvimento, o fato de que estas solicitações
tenham, portanto, partido do Brasil, beneficia as corporações transnacionais. Quaisquer concessões feitas ao
Brasil serão automaticamente estendidas, a partir da cláusula da nação mais favorecida, a todos os membros
da OMC. Assim, as transnacionais norte-americanas e européias, que dominam completamente o comércio
internacional de serviços, vão tirar vantagens da posição de barganha brasileira assumida no GATS pelo Brasil.”
Ellen Gould: A Posição do Brasil nas Negociações do GATS (Acordo Geral sobre Comércio de Serviços), p. 1:
http://www.rebrip.org.br/publique/media/Ellen%20Gould.doc. Own translation: “The GATS negotiation documents
show that the Brazilian government, led by president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, before leaving his post, decided
to take a more aggressive position regarding the issue of the liberalization of services, than all other WTO members.
In its negotiation requests Brazil spoke out against subsidies for public programs and openly defended the
elimination of tax-exemptions conceded to monopolies and the public sector. If the formal negotiation guidelines
favor the bargaining proposal presented by the developing countries, the fact that this position is advantegeous
for Brazil, benefits the transnational corporations. Every concession made to Brazil will automatically be extended,
through the MFN clause, to all WTO members. In this way the North American and European transnationals, which
completely dominate the international trade of services, will take advantage of the Brazilian bargaining position,
which was assumed in the GATS by Brazil.”
299 “EM 1997, a LDB (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases) abriu essa possibilidade e nós a regulamentamos. Até então, o ensino
superior não podia ter fins lucrativos.” Paulo Renato Souza, in: Estado de São Paulo, August 20, 2003. Own
translation: “In 1997 the LDB law opened up this possibility and we regulated it. Until then, higher education could
not be profit-oriented.”