Download - FDCL

More documents

Recommendations

Info

104 4.3 Brazil, foreign direct investment in GATS-2000 and the demands of the European Commission In the negotiations on services the Brazilian side and the EU-commission agree on their definitions of services, in analogy to the four kinds of GATS, where the topic of investment as Mode 3 includes the treatment of foreign branches of service companies. 303 But regardless of the existing relatively lax legislation which Brazil imposes on foreign investors, the European Commission in its “GATS-Requests” in the framework of GATS-2000 has demanded far reaching liberalization measures for investment in the area of services. 304 Even if the European Commission has explicitly asserted in the introductory text to the GATS-2000 Request from the EC and its Member States (hereafter the EC) to Brazil that: “the EC is not seeking the dismantling of public services nor the privatization of state owned companies”, 305 as the procurement of public goods is not to be abolished, but to be commercialized and opened up to foreign corporations, especially European ones. The GATS with its broad regulatory framework concerning liberalization is to guarantee this. And in any case Brazil will have to continue to privatize state enterprises due to the pressure of the IMF and the practical constraints resulting from its debt-trap. 306 According to the contract made by the former government FHC with the IMF, which gives way for new credit lines up to 30 billion US-dollars, and which has been renewed under the same conditions by the Lula-government, Brazil has to reach an annual primary budget surplus of 4.25%: The politically controlled component of the Lula-government, from a macroeconomic point of view, consists of making cuts to the government budget, that is to cut state spending at a high social cost, 307 as well as the obligation to generate currency earnings through exports, and finally to 303 See Maria Silvia Portella de Castro: Mercosul e União Européia: relações econômicas e comercias e as negociações do Acordo de Cooperação Inter-Regional, January 2003, p. 35. 304 There are no details available on the requests of the European Commission to Brazil and the MERCOSUR within the framework of the negotiations on the “association treaty”, except for the avowal of the EU to treat the issue of “investment” in analogy to the Doha-agenda of the WTO. 305 GATS-2000 Request from the EC and its Member States (hereafter the EC) to Brazil, p. ii., http://www.gatswatch.org/ docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf. 306 See the IMF website at: http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2003/bra/04/index.htm: “Brazil - Letter of Intent”, November 21, 2003: “This Letter of Intent of the government of Brazil describes the policies that Brazil intends to implement in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF.” 307 See: PAULO NOGUEIRA BATISTA JR. (USP / FGV-EAESP): DIRETO AO PONTO, in: Agência Carta Maior, December 16, 2003: “O superávit primário passou de 3,5% do PIB em 2000 para 3,6% em 2001, 4% em 2002 e 4,3% em 2003.” Own translation: “The primary surplus rose from 3.5% of GDP in 2000 to 3.6% in 2001, 4% in 2002 and 4.3% in 2003.”
e able to pay the interest on the foreign debt 308 and to continue to privatize stateowned companies. This means that the maximum market solution does not have to be demanded in every single treaty or agreement- due to the interaction of the various institutions and international trade agreements, this creates an explosive mix. The GATS-2000 Requests of the European Commission try to approach the topic from other perspectives: The European Commission, for example, is trying to restrain the rights of the Brazilian Central Bank to control and regulate the crossboarder flows of capital and currencies [Author's note: In the following quote the first phrase represents the Brazilian negotiation position, starting with “EC Request” the demands of the European Commission are stated.]: “The Central Bank establishes procedures related to remittances and transfer of funds abroad. EC Request: Clarification of the horizontal commitment is requested. If the term “procedures” comprises any kind of restriction, it should be eliminated on the grounds that it was not scheduled.” 309 If the financial crises of the “emerging countries” should repeat themselves, the hands of the Brazilian government would be tied by the international treaty. They would not be able to implement short-term tools to influence or control its development, which are currently still allowed by the Brazilian Constitution: the market would be left to resolve the problem. The European Commission also wants to abolish Brazilian legislation which refers to the establishment or settlement of a company according to the principle of sole proprietor and partnership: 308 In questions of debt and interest payment the same principle applies to the Lula-government as to the Cardoso government. See: BBC Mundo: Economista critica pressão externa por mais exportações, citing Werner Baer, professor of the University of Illinois: “Mas, à medida que os Estados Unidos, a Europa e o FMI forçam o Brasil a manter em dia o serviço da dívida externa, eles forçam o governo brasileiro, indiretamente, a enfatizar o crescimento das exportações [...] Sem essa pressão, ou se fosse perdoada parte da dívida externa, isso também diminuiria a pressão sobre o governo de enfatizar o setor externo e ele poderia aumentar as despesas internas para melhorar a situação dos pobres.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2002/021004_baerrg.shtml. Own translation: “Furthermore, if the United States, Europe or the IMF force Brazil to be up to date with the foreign debt payment, they are forcing the Brazilian government indirectly, to emphasize export growth [...] Without this pressure, or if a part of the foreign debt was to be pardoned, this would also take pressure from the government to emphasize the external sector and this could make possible a rise in internal spending to improve the situation of the poor.” 309 GATS 2000. Request from the EC and its Member States (hereafter the EC) to Brazil, see: http://www.gatswatch.org/ docs/offreq/EUrequests/Brazil.pdf. 105
Page 2 and 3:
Christian Russau Enforcement of int
Page 4 and 5:
Preface Since the end of 1999 the C
Page 6 and 7:
If the “Interregional Association
Page 8 and 9:
8 Chapter 5: The enforcement of int
Page 10 and 11:
10 1.1 Negotiations of the “Inter
Page 12 and 13:
12 A similar agreement of the so-ca
Page 14 and 15:
14 tute in the eyes of many countri
Page 16 and 17:
16 amaraty, where the FTAA-negotiat
Page 18 and 19:
18 free trade agreement between the
Page 20 and 21:
20 at the UN Millenium Summit to ha
Page 22 and 23:
22 on the possibility of a unilater
Page 24 and 25:
24 tual contradictions between the
Page 26 and 27:
26 fired. The workers union OGB-L,
Page 28 and 29:
28 policy and EU development policy
Page 31 and 32:
Chapter 2: Foreign direct investmen
Page 33 and 34:
50% in 2002 as compared to the prev
Page 35 and 36:
The reasons for propagating this co
Page 37 and 38:
• according to a study conducted
Page 39 and 40:
promotion of domestic demand, in or
Page 41 and 42:
2.2 International Agreements and Tr
Page 43 and 44:
2.3 The World Trade Organization WT
Page 45 and 46:
• trade and investment • compet
Page 47 and 48:
2.3.3 The GATS agreement The Genera
Page 49 and 50:
which works on a profit-basis, sees
Page 51 and 52:
“deadline: by 1 January 2005”.
Page 53 and 54: “discrimination” or “expropri
Page 55: Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)
Page 58 and 59: 58 3.1 European foreign investment
Page 60 and 61: 60 zations and liberalization in La
Page 62 and 63: 62 the profitability, on the electr
Page 64 and 65: 64 America. Also the issue of human
Page 66 and 67: 66 • Thirdly the WTO Dispute Sett
Page 68 and 69: 68 to the U.S. trade power by rapid
Page 70 and 71: 70 The largest trade balance defici
Page 72 and 73: 72 OECD area by European companies.
Page 74 and 75: 74 EDF, has issued a similar compla
Page 76 and 77: 76 European automobile producers in
Page 78 and 79: 78 But not only international law o
Page 80 and 81: 80 ment,” which in the beginning
Page 82 and 83: 82 4. 1 The free trade agreement be
Page 84 and 85: 84 issues for us.” 233 On the oth
Page 86 and 87: 86 capital flows” explicitly. The
Page 88 and 89: 88 which also speaks out against th
Page 90 and 91: 90 in Congress and encouraged the B
Page 92 and 93: 92 studies in 2003 on the impact of
Page 94 and 95: 94 The MEBF successfully works as a
Page 96 and 97: 96 “We have tried to explain how
Page 98 and 99: 98 4.2 The example of Brazil: Forei
Page 100 and 101: 100 Brazilian Constitution. This wo
Page 102 and 103: 102 countries through CC-5 accounts
Page 106 and 107: 106 “Commercial Presence: The jur
Page 108 and 109: 108 Providing cheaper access to wat
Page 110 and 111: 110
Page 112 and 113: 112 5.1 Foreign direct investment i
Page 114 and 115: 114 The agreement on government pro
Page 116 and 117: 116 5.2 The case of Chile: Foreign
Page 118 and 119: 118 which was believed to be dead,
Page 120 and 121: 120 c) The still pending Doha “De
Page 122 and 123: 122 gesamtamerikanischen Freihandel
Page 124 and 125: 124 · http://europa.eu.int/comm/co
Page 126 and 127: 126 · http://www.citizen.org/ · h
Page 128 and 129: 128 · http://www.rebrip.org.br ·
Page 130 and 131: 130 um den Markt der wiederentdeckt
Page 132 and 133: 132 · Torrent, Ramón: Acordos Int
Page 134 and 135: 134 DIHK Deutscher Industrie- und H
Page 136 and 137: 136 Lomé Lomé-Agreement between E
Page 138 and 139: About FDCL is a nonprofitorganizati
show all

Download - FDCL

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?