Download - FDCL

More documents

Recommendations

Info

72 OECD area by European companies. [...] Traditional FDI patterns were the result of European investors’ preference for large and protected markets. Notably in the automobile and chemical industries, the size and growth of markets provided the major stimulus to FDI in the MERCOSUR region. Multinational companies used FDI mainly to overcome import barriers.” 179 While in 1991 only three European corporations where among the top ten Argentine companies, in 1999 there where already seven: YPF Repsol, Telefónica, Telecom, Supermercados Norte, Shell, Supermercados Discos and Carrefour. 180 Particularly in the business sectors, which were privatized and primarily sold to foreign corporations, like telecommunications, aviation, water and wastewater market, energy and gas, the highest percentual layoffs were implemented through firings and outsourcing in Argentina as a result of the privatizations. In terms of employee numbers, setting the index of 1990=100 shows that in 1998 the index in the telecommunications sector fell to 51, in aviation to 44, in the water and waste water sector to 52, in gas to 48 and in the energetic sector to 30. 181 According to these numbers no new jobs were created through FDI in Argentina in the nineties, instead jobs were cut. The liberalized drinking water market had turned out to be an especially sensitive area in the nineties. Between 1991 and 1999 one third of the Argentinian potable water market, which covers the water supply of nearly 60 percent of the population, was privatized. 182 The biggest takeover was the acquisition of Obras Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN) by Aguas Argentinas, of which the French Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux holds 39.93 percent, Aguas de Barcelona holds 25.01 percent (of which Suez is the majority shareholder, next to the Spanish Endesa with 11.64% 183 ), the French Vivendi holds 7.55 percent and the British Anglian Water 184 holds 4.25 percent of the shares. 185 In 1993 Aguas Argentinas had agreed to invest 4 billion US-dollars to improve the infrastructure and expand the water pipe and sewerage systems. In exchange the Argentinian government accepted that the company’s personnel would be cut by 47% (from 7,600 to 4,000). 186 179 Ibid., p. 231. 180 Catalano, José: Las negociaciones MERCOSUR-Unión Europea: una visión desde la sociedad civil, preliminary version, December 2002, p. 34. 181 Ibid., p. 37. 182 UNCTAD: FDI AND DEVELOPMENT: The case of privatization-related services, TD/B/COM.2/EM.14/2, p. 11. 183 http://www.agbar.es/eng/nt/ntea001.htm. 184 Anglian Water is part of AWG Plc, where, among others, the Deutsche Bank AG holds shares amounting to 4.24 %. See: http://www.hemscott.co.uk/equities/company/cd02043.htm. 185 http://www.aguasargentinas.com.ar/frameset_aguas.html. 186 UNCTAD: FDI AND DEVELOPMENT: The case of privatization-related services, TD/B/COM.2/EM.14/2, p. 11.
Initially, Aguas Argentinas lowered the rates by 26.9%, but by 2001 the rates had increased by more than 100 percent. According to its board of directors between 1993 and 2001 the company had invested 1.7 billion US-dollars and had achieved an average profit rate of 23 percent during the 1990s as compared to 7-8 percent in the water industry in the United States and the United Kingdom. 187 While the company claims to have connected nearly 2 million people to the water system and 1.15 million to the sewer network between 1993 and 2001, the provincial government argues that 3.5 million people within Aguas Argentinas’ potential clients still lack water and sewage services. 188 In light of the financial crisis in Argentina, in 2002 the government abolished the “convertibility” systems that had pegged the Peso, i.e., the company’s profits could no longer be converted to the Dollar at an even parity. This led Aguas Argentinas and its Argentine subsidiaries to file complaints together with their European mother firms at the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), on the basis of the bilateral investment agreement between France and Argentina, which was signed on July 3, 1991 and came into force March 3, 1993. In addition, Argentina, at the same time as Chile and Bolivia, already ratified the ICSID-Convention, which constitutes another juridical basis for foreign investors. But as a complaint at an ad-hoc-arbitration court takes some time, Suez saw itself obligated to write-off 500 million US-dollars in its 2002 consolidated balance sheet. 189 The French Vivendi sued the Republic of Argentina alleging “violations of the BIT’s provisions on fair & equitable treatment and against expropriation without compensation” 190 in the case of its subsidiary Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. from the Tucuman region (ICSID Case N° ARB/97/3). 191 The Enron subsidiary Azurix also filed a complaint against the Republic of Argentina with the ICSID on October 23, 2001 (ICSID Case N° ARB/01/12) concerning its water concession contract. This wave of dispute cases initiated by private investors against the Republic of Argentina is not restricted to the water sector only, but also extends itself to the gas and energy sectors, where, e.g., the Belgian-French corporation Total Fina Elf has demanded a compensation of one billion US-dollars, filing with the ICSID, due to the freezing of “hydrocarbons prices and derivates, plus the devaluation of the Argentine currency” in the course of the Argentine crisis in 2002. 192 The Electricité de France, 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 Peterson, Luke Eric (International Institute for Sustainable Development – IISD): Research Note: Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustainable Development, August 2003, p. 9. 191 Tawil, Guido Santiago (M.& M.Bomchil, Buenos Aires): Investor-State-Arbitration : A hot issue in Latin America, 2002, p. 2. 192 Mercopress, November 11, 2003. 73
Page 2 and 3:
Christian Russau Enforcement of int
Page 4 and 5:
Preface Since the end of 1999 the C
Page 6 and 7:
If the “Interregional Association
Page 8 and 9:
8 Chapter 5: The enforcement of int
Page 10 and 11:
10 1.1 Negotiations of the “Inter
Page 12 and 13:
12 A similar agreement of the so-ca
Page 14 and 15:
14 tute in the eyes of many countri
Page 16 and 17:
16 amaraty, where the FTAA-negotiat
Page 18 and 19:
18 free trade agreement between the
Page 20 and 21:
20 at the UN Millenium Summit to ha
Page 22 and 23: 22 on the possibility of a unilater
Page 24 and 25: 24 tual contradictions between the
Page 26 and 27: 26 fired. The workers union OGB-L,
Page 28 and 29: 28 policy and EU development policy
Page 31 and 32: Chapter 2: Foreign direct investmen
Page 33 and 34: 50% in 2002 as compared to the prev
Page 35 and 36: The reasons for propagating this co
Page 37 and 38: • according to a study conducted
Page 39 and 40: promotion of domestic demand, in or
Page 41 and 42: 2.2 International Agreements and Tr
Page 43 and 44: 2.3 The World Trade Organization WT
Page 45 and 46: • trade and investment • compet
Page 47 and 48: 2.3.3 The GATS agreement The Genera
Page 49 and 50: which works on a profit-basis, sees
Page 51 and 52: “deadline: by 1 January 2005”.
Page 53 and 54: “discrimination” or “expropri
Page 55: Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)
Page 58 and 59: 58 3.1 European foreign investment
Page 60 and 61: 60 zations and liberalization in La
Page 62 and 63: 62 the profitability, on the electr
Page 64 and 65: 64 America. Also the issue of human
Page 66 and 67: 66 • Thirdly the WTO Dispute Sett
Page 68 and 69: 68 to the U.S. trade power by rapid
Page 70 and 71: 70 The largest trade balance defici
Page 74 and 75: 74 EDF, has issued a similar compla
Page 76 and 77: 76 European automobile producers in
Page 78 and 79: 78 But not only international law o
Page 80 and 81: 80 ment,” which in the beginning
Page 82 and 83: 82 4. 1 The free trade agreement be
Page 84 and 85: 84 issues for us.” 233 On the oth
Page 86 and 87: 86 capital flows” explicitly. The
Page 88 and 89: 88 which also speaks out against th
Page 90 and 91: 90 in Congress and encouraged the B
Page 92 and 93: 92 studies in 2003 on the impact of
Page 94 and 95: 94 The MEBF successfully works as a
Page 96 and 97: 96 “We have tried to explain how
Page 98 and 99: 98 4.2 The example of Brazil: Forei
Page 100 and 101: 100 Brazilian Constitution. This wo
Page 102 and 103: 102 countries through CC-5 accounts
Page 104 and 105: 104 4.3 Brazil, foreign direct inve
Page 106 and 107: 106 “Commercial Presence: The jur
Page 108 and 109: 108 Providing cheaper access to wat
Page 110 and 111: 110
Page 112 and 113: 112 5.1 Foreign direct investment i
Page 114 and 115: 114 The agreement on government pro
Page 116 and 117: 116 5.2 The case of Chile: Foreign
Page 118 and 119: 118 which was believed to be dead,
Page 120 and 121: 120 c) The still pending Doha “De
Page 122 and 123:
122 gesamtamerikanischen Freihandel
Page 124 and 125:
124 · http://europa.eu.int/comm/co
Page 126 and 127:
126 · http://www.citizen.org/ · h
Page 128 and 129:
128 · http://www.rebrip.org.br ·
Page 130 and 131:
130 um den Markt der wiederentdeckt
Page 132 and 133:
132 · Torrent, Ramón: Acordos Int
Page 134 and 135:
134 DIHK Deutscher Industrie- und H
Page 136 and 137:
136 Lomé Lomé-Agreement between E
Page 138 and 139:
About FDCL is a nonprofitorganizati
show all

Download - FDCL

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?