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106 “Commercial Presence: The juridical person referred as “sole proprietorship” and “partnership” in Article XXVIII of the GATS are not considered as such under Brazilian law. EC Request: The reference included in Article XXVIII is non-exhaustive (including...) and the elimination of sole-proprietorship and partnership does not clarify if Brazilian law limits the possibility of establishing juridical persons or if similar forms of commercial presence appear under Brazilian law under different statutes/denominations. Eliminate this restriction.” 310 Similarly, the Brazilian regulations that stipulate a minimum quota for the local workforce employed in service branches of foreign companies, as well as restrictions for non-resident service providers are a thorn in the side of the European Commission: “Quantitative Restriction: In certain sectors, at least 2/3 of workforce must be Brazilian. EC Request: Eliminate this requirement in relation to intra-corporate transfers of the categories covered by Brazil’s commitments (i.e. technical specialists, highly qualified professionals, managers and directors), as well as where the service supplier has no commercial presence in Brazil.” 311 And in the section of “Environmental Services – EC Request to Brazil” the Commission complains that: 310 Ibid. 311 Ibid. 312 Ibid. “Brazil has not undertaken commitments in environmental services. This request is based on the EC proposal for the classification of environmental services. While discussions on classification in this sector are still ongoing, the EC would like to invite Brazil to present its offer in accordance with this proposal, without prejudice to the outcome of the discussion on the classification of environmental services”. 312
Open discussions might, generally speaking, facilitate a more efficient communication, but it can be legitimately doubted whether an invitation to participate in an open minded discussion in the area of tough, intense negotiations on international trade regimes can be seen as a serious attempt to let the discussions be guided by the ‘unforced force of the better argument’ and to let this direction have an effect on the final outcomes. The European Commission makes it immediately clear in the following paragraph, that it would like to see the Brazilian drinking water sector, as well as the wastewater management sector subjected to the principles of free market access and National Treatment: “A.WATER FOR HUMAN USE & WASTEWATER MANAGMENT Water collection, purification and distribution services through mains, except steam and hot water This sub-sector only concerns the distribution of water through mains’ (i.e. urban sewage systems). This excludes any cross-border transportation either by pipeline or by any other means of transport, nor does it imply access to water resources. - Mode 3: Take commitments under MA and NT” 313 “MA” in this case would mean far-reaching market access for European corporations and “NT” would mean the granting of identical juridical treatment for European water corporations with Brazilian suppliers. This demand for a liberalization of the Brazilian drinking water market would mean the total commercialization of the Brazilian market for drinking water in all federal states and municipalities. The service, i.e., water from the tap will then only be provided against payment under market conditions. Price-ceilings set by the state or the region would not be permitted due to the international treaty based on the principle of national treatment. The price is determined by the market and poorer segments of the population would face the risk of having their water turned off or the risk of not even being connected to the water network. The installation of new water pipes in marginal or low-income sectors would only occur, if the investment for the company would be profitable: Municipalities could not give subsidies or any kind of public funds for this purpose, unless those subsidies were available to the European suppliers under the same conditions. 313 Ibid. 107
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Christian Russau Enforcement of int
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Preface Since the end of 1999 the C
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If the “Interregional Association
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8 Chapter 5: The enforcement of int
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10 1.1 Negotiations of the “Inter
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12 A similar agreement of the so-ca
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14 tute in the eyes of many countri
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16 amaraty, where the FTAA-negotiat
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18 free trade agreement between the
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20 at the UN Millenium Summit to ha
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22 on the possibility of a unilater
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24 tual contradictions between the
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26 fired. The workers union OGB-L,
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28 policy and EU development policy
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Chapter 2: Foreign direct investmen
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50% in 2002 as compared to the prev
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The reasons for propagating this co
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• according to a study conducted
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promotion of domestic demand, in or
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2.2 International Agreements and Tr
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2.3 The World Trade Organization WT
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• trade and investment • compet
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2.3.3 The GATS agreement The Genera
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which works on a profit-basis, sees
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“deadline: by 1 January 2005”.
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“discrimination” or “expropri
Page 55: Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)
Page 58 and 59: 58 3.1 European foreign investment
Page 60 and 61: 60 zations and liberalization in La
Page 62 and 63: 62 the profitability, on the electr
Page 64 and 65: 64 America. Also the issue of human
Page 66 and 67: 66 • Thirdly the WTO Dispute Sett
Page 68 and 69: 68 to the U.S. trade power by rapid
Page 70 and 71: 70 The largest trade balance defici
Page 72 and 73: 72 OECD area by European companies.
Page 74 and 75: 74 EDF, has issued a similar compla
Page 76 and 77: 76 European automobile producers in
Page 78 and 79: 78 But not only international law o
Page 80 and 81: 80 ment,” which in the beginning
Page 82 and 83: 82 4. 1 The free trade agreement be
Page 84 and 85: 84 issues for us.” 233 On the oth
Page 86 and 87: 86 capital flows” explicitly. The
Page 88 and 89: 88 which also speaks out against th
Page 90 and 91: 90 in Congress and encouraged the B
Page 92 and 93: 92 studies in 2003 on the impact of
Page 94 and 95: 94 The MEBF successfully works as a
Page 96 and 97: 96 “We have tried to explain how
Page 98 and 99: 98 4.2 The example of Brazil: Forei
Page 100 and 101: 100 Brazilian Constitution. This wo
Page 102 and 103: 102 countries through CC-5 accounts
Page 104 and 105: 104 4.3 Brazil, foreign direct inve
Page 108 and 109: 108 Providing cheaper access to wat
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Page 112 and 113: 112 5.1 Foreign direct investment i
Page 114 and 115: 114 The agreement on government pro
Page 116 and 117: 116 5.2 The case of Chile: Foreign
Page 118 and 119: 118 which was believed to be dead,
Page 120 and 121: 120 c) The still pending Doha “De
Page 122 and 123: 122 gesamtamerikanischen Freihandel
Page 124 and 125: 124 · http://europa.eu.int/comm/co
Page 126 and 127: 126 · http://www.citizen.org/ · h
Page 128 and 129: 128 · http://www.rebrip.org.br ·
Page 130 and 131: 130 um den Markt der wiederentdeckt
Page 132 and 133: 132 · Torrent, Ramón: Acordos Int
Page 134 and 135: 134 DIHK Deutscher Industrie- und H
Page 136 and 137: 136 Lomé Lomé-Agreement between E
Page 138 and 139: About FDCL is a nonprofitorganizati
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