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14 tute in the eyes of many countries, who belong to the Cairns-Group, non-tariff trade barriers that only serve to advance the protectionism of the “North”. 9 According to estimates, subsidies of OECD countries that were used to protect their own agricultural markets averaged 360 billion US-dollars annually. 10 Thus, it is not surprising that in the negotiations between the EU and MERCO- SUR the agricultural sector is considered to be the central issue of negotiations. In addition, the trade of agricultural goods is the only trade sector where the four MER- COSUR countries have a positive trade balance with the EU. They therefore anticipate an increased economic potential from an opening up of European agricultural markets through a free trade agreement: EU MERCHANDISE TRADE WITH MERCOSUR BY PRODUCT (2002): Source: DG Trade: http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/html/111832.htm In 2002 Paraguay had a surplus in the trade of agricultural products with the 15 EU countries of 78.7 million Euros, exporting goods worth 98.9 million Euro and importing agricultural products valued at 20.2 million Euros. 11 Argentina achieved a surplus of 4.6 billion Euro, from exports of 4.7 billion Euros and imports of 0.1 billion 9 “Mercosul faz acordo para combater barreiras: O uso crescente de normas técnicas para restringir o acesso de produtos importados levou os países do Mercosul a firmarem um acordo, ontem, para defenderem, em bloco, os interesses de exportadores brasileiros, argentinos, paraguaios e uruguaios, contra exigências ambientais, de saúde ou outro tipo de barreira burocrática não previsto em tratados” Valor Econômico 2.12.2003. Own translation: “The MERCOSUR agrees on combating barriers: the increasing use of technical norms to restrict the access of imported goods took the MERCOSUR countries to sign an agreement yesterday against environmental-, health- or other types of bureaucratical barriers which are not mentioned in the treaties.” 10 See, e.g., Das Parlament, No. 16 – 17, April 13/20, 2001. 11 “Paraguay”, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels October, 2003.
Euros. 12 Uruguay had a surplus of 0.3 billion Euros, exporting 0.4 billion Euros and importing 0.1 billion Euros 13 , and Brazil attained a surplus of 7.4 billion Euros, with exports of 7.9 billion Euros and imports of 0.5 billion Euros. 14 Above all, it is the so-called “agro-industry” in the four MERCOSUR countries that hope for better export opportunities as a consequence of a EU-MERCOSUR free trade agreement containing tariff-cuts and the reduction of European agricultural subsidies. However, given the current international trade regimes it is not clear that such results will automatically occur: “While these treaties force developing countries to extensively open their markets for EU-products there are still high European tariff-barriers for agricultural goods which are also being produced in the EU. The FTAs with South Africa, Mexico and Chile furthermore include security clauses for the case that a rapid rise of trade flows threatens the overall economic situation of a partner – in reality this leaves a way out for the EU to close their markets temporarily if a southern partner achieves a successful increase of exports.” 15 Nevertheless, the four governments of the MERCOSUR agree that in the agricultural sector, for them the “central and essential” issue, success can be achieved. This, however, would require as a prerequisite “substantial concessions” from the EU negotiation team led by Karl Falkenberg. 16 Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that despite the priority that this interest is given, for example, by the strong Brazilian agricultural export lobby, one cannot assume a unified position of each particular government. Despite the expressed importance of the agricultural sector to the Brazilian government, even there, there are those with the opinion that the importance of the other issues of the marathon negotiations should not be neglected. Because of this there was a considerable amount of disagreement within the Brazilian government during the preparations of the FTAA-negotiation round from November 20-21, 2003. The responsible authority on the Brazilian side for all internal MERCOSUR- as well as FTAA- and EU-MERCOSUR-negotiations is the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, It- 12 “Argentina”, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, June 2003. 13 “Uruguay”, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, June 2003. 14 “Brazil”, DG Trade A2/CG/SG/WB, Brussels, June 2003. 15 Own translation of the following original text: “Während die Abkommen die Entwicklungsländer zwingen, ihre Märkte weitgehend für EU-Produkte zu öffnen, bestehen gerade für viele der in der EU produzierten landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnisse weiterhin hohe Zollschranken für Einfuhren aus dem Süden. Die Freihandelsabkommen mit Südafrika, Mexiko und Chile sehen darüber hinaus eine Sicherheitsklausel für den Fall vor, daß ein sprunghaftes Ansteigen der Handelsflüsse einen Sektor oder die gesamtökonomische Situation eines Partners bedroht - de facto eine Hintertür der EU, um ihre Märkte für den Fall einer erfolgreichen Exportsteigerung eines südlichen Partners vorübergehend zu schließen.” Taken from Schilder, Klaus (WEED): Regionalisierung unter neoliberalem Vorzeichen? Die politökonomische Geographie der EU-Handelspolitik, June 10, 2003, http://www.weed-online.org/artikel/18513.html. 16 The Brazilian Secretary of Agriculture repeatedly defines the agricultural sector as a priority: “primazia da questão agrícola”, see, e.g.; http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/economia/story/2003/11/031112_amorimcmmla.shtml. 15
Page 2 and 3: Christian Russau Enforcement of int
Page 4 and 5: Preface Since the end of 1999 the C
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