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66 • Thirdly the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on November 10, 2003 167 also declared US-import tariffs for foreign steel as illicit and again allowed the EU to cross-retaliate up to an amount of 2.242 billion US-dollars 168 and • Fourthly the EU on September 22nd – shortly after the “failure” of Cancún – reactivated the three year old WTO-dispute with the U.S.A. referred to the so-called 1916 US Anti-Dumping Act, in order to also take “punitive or protectory measures” in this case. 169 After the “failure” of Cancún and after it became clear that the multilateral negotiations of the WTO could not be brought to an end within the schedule of the Doha Agenda, the U.S. as well as the EU were increasingly able relax the lip services concerning a “real multilateralism”, so that an intense activity of bilateral negotiations on FTAs could start with selected countries of interest for the U.S. 170 and the EU. 171 It is neither a thematic nor a timely coincidence, but a reflection of the competition between the U.S.A. and Europe in trade-related questions, that the EU, after the “failure” of Cancún as well as the weakening of Europe in foreign trade due to the weaker dollar and the strengthening Euro, is planning to activate the retaliatory measures assigned by the WTO in the case of the “Foreign Sales Companies” as well as the “US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act” dispute case, also in order to simply put a stop to an impending rise in imports from the US caused by a falling dollar. Even though the implementation of the WTO judgment is doubtful, as the “material damage” caused is not directly restituted to the claimant and its realization depends on the trade related countermeasures, the political dimension of this procedure should not be underestimated. The increasingly openly led trade competition between the U.S. and the EU has 167 “The Appellate Body, on November 10, 2003, issued its report on the complaints brought to the WTO by Brazil, China, the European Communities, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland against the United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products. It upheld most of the Panel’s conclusions that the U.S. measures were inconsistent with the WTO Safeguards Agreement and the GATT 1994”, http: //www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm. 168 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm#248_259_abr, also see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/ issues/sectoral/industry/steel/pr101103_en.htm, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/steel/ memo101103_en.htm. 169 “Three years after the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 was found incompatible with WTO rules, the EU is still waiting for concrete signs that the US will repeal its condemned legislation. Confronted with persisting inaction, the EU has decided to reactivate the arbitration process that will decide on retaliatory measures. [...] But, the persisting inaction of the U.S. leaves the EU no other option than to exercise this right under the WTO.” EU seeks retaliatory and protective measures in US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act dispute, Brussels, September 22, 2003: http://europa.eu.int/ comm/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/pr220903_en.htm. 170 Robert B.Zoellick: America will not wait for the won’t-do countries, in: FT, September 22, 2003, p .23, http: //www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/2003-09-22-ft.htm. 171 See the revealing speach of Pascal Lamy: “Trade Crisis?”, European Institute, Washington, November 4, 2003, http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla198_en.htm.
thereby significantly approached the boarderline of an open trade war. 172 Literally at the last minute president Bush (jr.) lifted the tariffs in the “Steel Safeguard Case”, in order to avoid cross retaliation by the EU and other countries. – This cannot obscure the fact that this economic conflict is latent and consequently the currency-competition between the Euro and the dollar is also affected. The competition for markets between the EU and the U.S. is also revealed in Latin America: The European bilateral strategy after the implementation of the FTAs with Chile and Mexico, to rapidly conclude a bilateral agreement with MERCOSUR – if possible before the signing of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA/ALCA) – is also a reflection of this: “The race [between the U.S. and Europe] will not be continued in Latin America alone, but it is the playing field where, with the FTAA and the EU- MERCOSUR projects, the competition between the Euro and the dollar is reflected most explicitly. 173 ” According to a report from the ila journal, the feeling of rivalry between the U.S. and Europe concerning the competition for Latin American markets has in the meantime reached a critical mass: “German economic officials look towards a possible overall American free trade area with discomfort. 174 ” And the new fourth generation of regional trade agreements aims primarily at enforcing European commercial and economic interests: “The EU has so far not been able to demonstrate in a convincing manner, that the extensive agenda of the new generation of trade agreements promotes a broad socially just and ecologically compatible development in the South. The European trade policy is a horse of a different color: The Community aims to expand its exports to the countries of the South and will concentrate on safeguarding new markets, particularly in the areas of high technologies and services, but also with respect to the enlargement of foreign investment-flows in the processing sector, privatization-programs and investment in extractive industries. Strategically the EU is out to set a trade-related counterbalance 172 Topstory-report, BBC World News, November 18, 2003. 173 Own translation of the following original text: “Das Rennen [zwischen USA und Europa] wird nicht nur in Lateinamerika weitergehen, aber es ist das Spielfeld, auf dem sich mit ALCA und mit dem EU-MERCOSUR-Vorhaben die Konkurrenz zwischen Euro und Dollar am deutlichsten widerspiegelt.” Taken from: Ling, Martin: Lateinamerika im Visier der Europäischen Union. Europa wetteifert mit den USA um den Markt der wiederentdeckten “Neuen Welt”, in: Lateinamerika Nachrichten No. 349/350, Berlin: July/August 2003, p. 7. 174 Own translation of the following original text: “Deutsche Wirtschaftsbeamte sehen einer möglichen gesamtamerikanischen Freihandelszone mit Unbehagen entgegen.” Taken from: Daniel Boss: Wettlauf mit den USA. Deutsche Wirtschaftsbeamte sehen einer möglichen gesamtamerikanischen Freihandelszone mit Unbehagen entgegen, in: ila No. 260, November 15, 2002, p. 34. 67
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Christian Russau Enforcement of int
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Preface Since the end of 1999 the C
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If the “Interregional Association
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8 Chapter 5: The enforcement of int
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10 1.1 Negotiations of the “Inter
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12 A similar agreement of the so-ca
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14 tute in the eyes of many countri
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120 c) The still pending Doha “De
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122 gesamtamerikanischen Freihandel
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126 · http://www.citizen.org/ · h
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130 um den Markt der wiederentdeckt
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132 · Torrent, Ramón: Acordos Int
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134 DIHK Deutscher Industrie- und H
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136 Lomé Lomé-Agreement between E
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