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considerable energy release as a result. The probability of creating such a configuration has not however been properly assessed. Other analyses [198] challenge this scenario and point out a number of factors that will make it very unlikely indeed for a spent fuel repository. A recent study [199] for the proposed Yucca mountain repository concludes that the concentrations reached for 239 Pu (or later for 235 U) from vitrified weapons-grade plutonium are too low for self-sustained criticality. In conclusion, conceivable ways of creating a risk of unintentional criticality have to be addressed for any repository for large amounts of fissile material. The assessment has to be done for each specific geological environment and repository design. There are however means to avoid such a risk and to make the criticality scenarios very unlikely indeed. 232
5. COMMENTARY ON EXISTING P&T SYSTEMS STUDIES 5.1 First generation systems study reports Partitioning and transmutation as a new waste management issue was initiated in the United States during the 1970s and investigated from a theoretical and assessment perspective at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Claiborne [200] demonstrated in 1972 the neutron-physical feasibility of transmuting “by-product actinides” in LWRs. Simultaneously the German Research Centre of Karlsruhe, the CEA in France and European Commission at the Joint Research Centre of Ispra started a comprehensive theoretical and experimental R&D programme. In France, the Castaing Commission conducted a general investigation in 1981-82 on the different approaches possible in the fuel cycle and included the P&T option as a mandatory route for further R&D. The studies were conducted during about ten years and were summarised in overview reports which showed the complexity of the issue and the discrepancy between the waste management “risk” approach on long-term disposal and the partitioning-transmutation approach aiming at the reduction of the radiotoxic inventory by recycling long lived nuclides into fission reactors. Four major final “assessment” reports were published in the early 1980s [201-205] which led to the following conclusions: • the ORNL studies conclude that there are no cost or safety incentives for partitioning and transmutation of actinides for waste management purposes since the long-term risk is mainly associated with long-lived fission products 99 Tc and 129 I and not with the actinides; • the reduction of the radiotoxic inventory of waste is theoretically possible but needs the development of advanced partitioning methods and the use of other types of reactors than the currently available LWRs; • the conclusions of the EC programmes on P&T were that the impossibility of total actinide recycling and the impact of the process flowsheets’ complexity on waste streams are the main limitation of the potential benefits from the proposed P&T scenarios for long-term hazard reduction; • partitioning would become worthwhile as a HLW management scheme if advanced fuel cycles such as recycling of plutonium and MAs through FBRs and LWRs were implemented, provided that the loss factors for fuel isotopes could be kept very low (
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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TABLE DES MATIÈRES NOTE DE SYNTHÈ
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PART II. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND SYS
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4. IMPACT OF P&T ON RISK ASSESSMENT
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Figure II.31 Evolution of the expec
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Part II: Technical analysis and sys
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There are several scenarios which c
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eactor concepts are still in the co
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intermediate storage management, th
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1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Involvement of
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and natural decay play an important
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Figure I.2 A schematic diagram of b
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Instead of recycling, one could ado
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to address there is the separation
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improvement of the biological shiel
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Figure I.3 A schematic diagram of t
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Figure1.5 A notional materials flow
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A few specific regulatory and safet
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• irradiation of FR-fuel in Fast
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dispersion in the geosphere or bios
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In the meantime the burn-up of spen
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Any reprocessing campaign of spent
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4. CRITICAL EVALUATION • P&T may
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS • Fundamen
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NOTE DE SYNTHÈSE ET PORTÉE DU RAP
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Présentation générale Cette part
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courts. L’application de cette te
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éalisable, à condition d’augmen
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PREMIÈRE PARTIE : PRÉSENTATION G
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La troisième réunion internationa
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1.5 Objectifs du rapport Dans l’e
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Figure I.1 Schéma de principe du c
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• l ’241 Am est le précurseur
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plutonium et environ 2 m 3 de déch
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2.3 Technologie de fabrication des
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cadre de la coopération EFTTRA ont
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On peut voir sur la Figure I.4 les
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Figure I.4 Flux de matières dans u
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À court terme, les produits de fis
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Par conséquent, au cas où l’on
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De nombreux laboratoires dans le mo
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usé devrait représenter environ 3
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le nucléide le plus gênant est le
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transuraniens. Pour obtenir un taux
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On peut considérer des opérations
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devrait en principe ouvrir de nouve
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5. CONCLUSIONS GÉNÉRALES • La m
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PART II: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND SYS
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1.1.1.1 Minor actinides Americium a
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thus preventing its dispersion in t
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By contrast, information about the
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DIDPA [5] (see Figure II.3) process
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The generation of secondary effluen
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Figure II.5 TRPO process TRPO solve
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According to Jarvinen et al. in LAN
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curium. • Separation of americium
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1.1.4.4 Separation of technetium an
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The second option is production of
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Figure II.9 Fuel cycle actinide bur
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Figure II.11 Flow sheet of pyro-rep
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The metathetical reaction between L
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This is confirmed by the radiotoxic
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For the same burn-up as in the pure
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planned for a burn-up range of 1.5
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On the basis of the study, it is no
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In a given reactor system, the diff
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- deterioration of the effectivenes
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Table II.5 Mass balances for homoge
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manufacture is 2 years. 12×24 targ
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Figure II.14 MA-loading methods in
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Table II.7 Mass balances for homoge
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Table II.8 Mass balances for hetero
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Core characteristics above: The fol
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Figure II.15 Concept of double stra
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Figure II.16 Concept of accelerator
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In Reference [99], the sodium coole
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In Germany, some small activities r
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OECD/NEA programmes The OECD/NEA Nu
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As a part of MA nuclear data evalua
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Table II.13 Pu and minor actinide b
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2.4.1.3 Transmutation in light wate
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3. DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT TRENDS IN
Page 176 and 177: The SPIN programme studied various
Page 178 and 179: • the RP1-2 scenario is compared
Page 180 and 181: Mass balance The MA mass balance, f
Page 182 and 183: 4. IMPACT OF P&T ON RISK ASSESSMENT
Page 184 and 185: For deterministic effects, in the c
Page 186 and 187: • accounting for a number of safe
Page 188 and 189: Table II.17 Effective dose coeffici
Page 190 and 191: MOX fuel and recycling of recovered
Page 192 and 193: Figure II.22 Potential radioactivit
Page 194 and 195: Moreover, plutonium recycling and m
Page 196 and 197: Curium is assumed to be stored for
Page 198 and 199: Figure II.25 shows the radiotoxicit
Page 200 and 201: decrease is obtained in the radioto
Page 202 and 203: 4.4 Risk and hazard assessment over
Page 204 and 205: 4.4.2 Radiological impact of waste
Page 206 and 207: 0.191 man-Sv/TWhe and the RFC with
Page 208 and 209: • conventional reprocessing does
Page 210 and 211: The maximum inventory of reactor co
Page 212 and 213: pursued. Since 137 Cs and 90 Sr are
Page 214 and 215: Figure II.26 Surface facilities. Ge
Page 216 and 217: Doses are controlled by 36 Cl up to
Page 218 and 219: Figure II.30 Overview of the canist
Page 220 and 221: surface. The reference repository i
Page 222 and 223: Figure II.34 Cavern-convection scen
Page 224 and 225: Figure II.36 Normal evolution scena
Page 228 and 229: • taking into account the potenti
Page 230 and 231: • on the subject of transmutation
Page 232 and 233: [12] Arnaud-Neu, F., et al., “Cal
Page 234 and 235: Fuel”, Proc. Int. Conf. on Future
Page 236 and 237: [64] Arai, T., Suzuki, Y., Handa, M
Page 238 and 239: [88] Murata, H., and Mukaiyama, T.,
Page 240 and 241: [117] Gudowski, W., “Accelerator-
Page 242 and 243: [146] D’angelo, A., Marimbeau, P.
Page 244 and 245: [172] OECD/NEA and IAEA, Uranium: R
Page 246: [202] Schmidt, E., Zamorani, E., Ha
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