Bridging the Gap: linking timber trade with infrastructural ...

are indicated on the licences. For example, wood harvested in Rufiji District is commonly recorded as
harvested in Mkuranga District whilst many traders claiming to harvest in Rufiji District are in reality
harvesting from Kilwa and Liwale Districts. In some cases, harvest licences are prepared after the trader
has harvested and transported the products to a checkpoint of the trader’s choice.
Large volumes of timber are felled without any licence. Indeed, none of the traders encountered during
this survey were carrying the necessary documentation. Research conducted in Rufiji District also noted
that none of the operators encountered during forest surveys were in possession of a valid licence
(Anon., 2002f). At Ikwiriri, it was noted that collectors of fuel wood and producers of charcoal from
miombo woodlands were not paying any royalties to the district or central government.
Large-scale, illegal trade has resulted in large discrepancies
between government records and actual trade levels. For example,
official harvest records barely matched the volume of timber
recorded leaving the study area, let alone products that left
unrecorded or those used within the study area. During 2001, a
total 10 163 m 3 round wood was issued on harvest licences in the
study area, matching fairly closely the official figure of 11 228 m 3
timber known to have left the study area. This included a total of
2420 m 3 round wood equivalent logs and planks reported as
shipments from Kilwa, Lindi and Mtwara ports during 2001, and
Abandoned logging camp, Liwale district.
8808 m 3 round wood equivalent recorded moving through Kibiti natural resources checkpoint, en route
to Dar es Salaam. However, these figures are a vast underestimate since they do not include subsistence
use of timber products, urban sales of timber in southern Tanzania, illegal harvesting and trade in timber.
Field research reliably estimated that five times as much timber passed north through Kibiti than was
officially recorded and significant quantities also leave the mainland unrecorded by sea.
Levels of illegal trade are significantly higher than estimates by forest officers working in the study area.
This level of undetected, illegal trade (77%) is close to the figure of 85% documented in Mwanza (Wells
et al., 2000). Hamerlynck (2003) estimated that government records from Rufiji District reflected a
maximum of 20-30% of the actual offtake.
Several important driving forces affect illegal activities in the study area, most importantly profit
margins and enforcement levels. Besides the various taxes required at local and central government
levels, operational costs in the timber business include transport, logging and sawing costs. Calculations
made in Rufiji District have shown that in general the timber trade is not profitable if one actually paid
all the desired royalties, taxes and environmental fees (Anon., 2002f). Calculations showed that
transport costs account for 40-50% of the total cost, while taxes account for 34-44 % and logging and
sawing account for 13-15%. To remain in business, a trader must explore opportunities of minimising
the payment of royalties and taxes. In reality, this is a relatively simple procedure due to the inefficient
government system of collecting forest revenue and enforcing forest legislation, in turn due to capacity
deficiencies. In particular, capacity is deficient in the areas of staffing levels, staffing expertise,
equipment, morale and operating budgets. Whilst enforcement levels are generally low and many
traders operate illegally with relative impunity in the study area, such activities may occur in
collaboration with corrupt officials. Enforcement efficiency is reduced further in some areas due to the
informal nature of harvesting and trade. For example, the widespread use of bicycles to transport planks
south of the Rufiji River from pitsawyers to the coast poses enormous challenges for law enforcement
Credit: Simon Milledge/
TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa
87