The FuTure oF nuclear Fuel cycle - MIT Energy Initiative

At least for the near term, economic incentives should be aligned with security goals, and
a focus on a multilateral NSG approach based on fuel cycle economic realities has a higher
probability of success. We have seen that the economically most sensible fuel cycle approach
for “green field” nuclear power programs is, and will remain for some time, LWRs for electricity
with long term storage of first-pass irradiated fuel. This supports an approach based
on economic incentive for limiting the spread of reprocessing, at least for several decades.
For fresh LWR fuel, limiting the spread of enrichment will require an economic and secure
supply. For small nuclear power deployments, as is the case for green field programs, the
economic choice is clearly purchase of fuel on the international competitive market.
The SNF will eventually require geological isolation of some or all of its constituents, depending
on whether SNF partitioning and/or recycling of plutonium/TRU is implemented
in the long term. Experience suggests that establishing national geological isolation programs
requires substantial resources and a political process that can be sustained over a
very long period. Avoiding this challenge carries substantial incentive for small nuclear
programs. This suggests a fuel leasing approach: the nuclear fuel supplier retains ownership
of the fuel and removes the SNF after a short cooling period back to the country of origin
or possibly to a third country that establishes an international geological repository. Clearly
the challenge that faces such an approach today is the willingness of the fuel supplier (or
third party country) to accept the SNF without requiring return of the constituents: in other
words, to lease the fuel rather than sell the fuel and provide storage/reprocessing services.
The fuel supplier would of course treat the returned SNF as it does its own, ideally long term
storage for many decades until the optimum fuel cycle path is determined. Without minimizing
the difficulty of SNF return, for this is indeed a major challenge, we stress that the
nuclear growth scenario described above suggests that the returned SNF in question would
likely be a small fraction of the SNF handled in the fuel supplier’s domestic program. In the
U.S., irradiated fuel from research reactors has already been returned for nonproliferation
reasons. The public must be informed about the tradeoff of a relatively small increment to
the waste management challenge in return for a major strengthening of the nonproliferation
regime, at least for the decades it will take to gain more clarity on the growth trajectory
of nuclear power globally and the technology pathways for fuel cycle development. The
failure to develop a broadly-accepted domestic SNF storage and disposal strategy limits U.S.
nonproliferation policy choices in the context of nuclear fuel cycles; thus, nonproliferation objectives
are served by effective waste management strategies.
One specific approach along these lines has been termed the Assured Nuclear Fuel Services
Initiative (ANFSI). 7 It specifically suggests that the leasing scheme be implemented between
commercial entities negotiating commercial contracts for fuel-service transactions. Importantly,
the contracts should, as is customary, have a fixed term, say ten years, during which
time the country leasing the fuel would agree to abstain from developing either enrichment
or reprocessing capability. There is a commercial logic to this abstention in that the
leasing country is not developing the capacity to compete against the supplier during the
contract period, in return for the benefits of economic supply of fresh fuel and elimination
of the waste challenge. The IAEA would apply safeguards to such transactions, ideally in the
framework of the Additional Protocol (see box). Of course the contracts can be renewed for
another period. The benefits of securing the nonproliferation advantages of fuel leasing for
a material period such as ten years should not be underestimated, rather than chasing the
illusion that countries will by treaty or long term binding agreement give up “rights” that
they insist are part and parcel of the NPT deal. Frankly, this will not happen except perhaps
in isolated cases, as should be evident from the experience of the last decade. 8 ANFSI does
chapter 8: Fuel cycles and nonproliferation 117