The FuTure oF nuclear Fuel cycle - MIT Energy Initiative

The United States initiated its repository program in the mid 1950s for the disposal of defense
wastes. After a series of failed attempts 10, 11 a major effort was undertaken in 1982 to
develop a long-term strategic program to build a repository for SNF and HLW. This effort
was supported by the Office of Technology Assessment 12 report that made recommendations
on how to site a repository. Its executive summary (including what was put in bold in
the original report) defined the challenge.
“The greatest single obstacle that a successful waste management program must overcome is
the severe erosion of public confidence in the Federal Government that past problems have
created. Federal credibility is questioned on three main grounds: 1) whether the Federal
Government will stick to any waste policy through changes in administration; 2) whether
it has the institutional capability to carry out a technically complex and politically sensitive
program over a period of decades; and 3) whether it can be trusted to respond adequately
to the concerns of States and others who will be affected by the waste management program.
OTA’s analysis suggests that, if history is not to repeat itself, and the current stalemate on
nuclear waste is not to continue, a comprehensive policy is needed that addresses the nearterm
problems of interim storage as part of an explicit and credible program for dealing with
the longer-term problem of developing a final waste isolation system. Such a policy must: 1)
adequately address the concerns and win the support of all the major interested parties, and
2) adopt a conservative technical and institutional approach—one that places high priority
on avoiding the problems that have repeatedly beset the program in the past.”
The history of efforts to build a geological repository for SNF and HLW since 1982 validate
many of the concerns of OTA. A number of lessons have been learned.
Waste program continuity is important. Successful waste programs have long-term continuity
in management. In the United States, WIPP had changes in management at the
Department of Energy but there was a stable management team at Sandia National Laboratory
13 . The continuity helped provide the trust at the local and state level. The same characteristics
are seen in successful foreign programs.
an appropriate funding mechanism is required that raises the funds and makes those
funds available to the repository program when required. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
authorized that disposal services be specified through contracts between DOE and the nuclear
utilities. Customers who use nuclear power pay for the disposal of spent fuel. As of
December, 2009, the Nuclear Waste Fund has about $29 billion. The funding mechanisms
to collect funds for the repository program have worked as intended. However, changes in
the law resulted in the Nuclear Waste Fund being part of the general federal budget. Congress
limited annual appropriations for the repository below the amounts requested to a
very small percentage of the waste fund balances. 14 The program has been funding limited.
DOE has failed to meet its contractual obligations. As a result, the nuclear utilities have won
significant financial judgments. The U.S. waste program does not have a viable mechanism
to use collected fees on an appropriate schedule to develop and build a repository.
public transparency and major outreach programs are critical. There are striking differences
between the large Swedish 15 , Finnish, and French repository outreach programs and
the limited outreach programs of the U.S. repository program. Partly this reflects siting
philosophy. Nations with voluntary siting strategies by definition must have major outreach
chapter 5: Waste Management 61