The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
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Again, the EU’s provision was broader than many national ones. Finland and France<br />
initiated new legislation to fully <strong>criminal</strong>ise conducts referred to in Article 2 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Framework Decision, whilst in 2004 Spain still did not <strong>criminal</strong>ise the fraudulent<br />
altering <strong>of</strong> payment instruments. 641 Likewise, Sweden provided for a narrow framework<br />
<strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong>isation and did<br />
“not provide for punishment if the fraudulent use <strong>of</strong> a stolen o otherwise un<strong>law</strong>fully<br />
appropriated, or <strong>of</strong> a counterfeited or falsified, payment instrument.” 642<br />
Latvia and Lithuania introduced new <strong>of</strong>fences in their national legislation with<br />
particular reference to computer programmes in order to comply with Article 4 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Framework Decision. 643 In 2006, Portuguese legislation also did not cover the <strong>of</strong>fences<br />
under Article 4 (2), whilst Luxembourg did not contain any <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences as<br />
referred to in Article 4 <strong>of</strong> the Framework Decision. 644 Finland in turn introduced a<br />
provision <strong>criminal</strong>ising the possession <strong>of</strong> accessories and material for counterfeiting in<br />
order to comply with EU’s measure. 645<br />
Still in the context <strong>of</strong> economic crime, Elholm notes how the implementation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Framework Decision on counterfeiting <strong>of</strong> the Euro 646 led to an increase in the scope <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> counterfeiting <strong>of</strong> coins and banknotes in Finland in order to include the<br />
import and export <strong>of</strong> forged coins and banknotes. Similarly in Sweden, it led to an<br />
introduction <strong>of</strong> a special <strong>of</strong>fence on the purchasing <strong>of</strong> counterfeited money. 647<br />
Similarly, the Framework Decision on combating corruption in the private sector<br />
requires Member States to <strong>criminal</strong>ise intentional active and passive corruption, namely<br />
promising, <strong>of</strong>fering or giving a person who directs or works for a private sector entity<br />
an undue advantage <strong>of</strong> any kind in order for that person to perform or refrain from<br />
performing any act in breach <strong>of</strong> his or her duties; or requesting or receiving an undue<br />
advantage <strong>of</strong> any kind or accepting the promise <strong>of</strong> such advantage while in any<br />
641 <strong>European</strong> Commission, Report from the Commission based on Article 14 <strong>of</strong> the Council<br />
Framework Decision <strong>of</strong> 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting <strong>of</strong> non cash means <strong>of</strong><br />
payment, COM (2004)346 final, Brussels, 30.4.2004, 18.<br />
642 Ibid.,18.<br />
643 <strong>European</strong> Commission, Second Report based on Article 14 <strong>of</strong> the Council Framework<br />
Decision <strong>of</strong> 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting <strong>of</strong> non-cash means <strong>of</strong> payment,<br />
COM (2006)65final, Brussels, 22.02.2006, 4.<br />
644 Ibid., 4.<br />
645 T. Elholm, “Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression”, supra<br />
note 637, 194.<br />
646 Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA, supra note 452.<br />
647 T. Elholm, “Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression”, supra<br />
note 637, 194.<br />
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