The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
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<strong>criminal</strong> sanctions, such as civil or administrative sanctions, will be sufficient to ensure<br />
policy implementation or whether <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> would address the problems more<br />
effectively. <strong>The</strong> second stage in the adoption <strong>of</strong> EU legislation is the decision <strong>of</strong> which<br />
concrete measure to adopt when there is a demonstrated need for <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong>. Here, the<br />
Commission identifies four main elements to be taken into consideration. First, it<br />
reasserts the EU’s competence to adopt minimum rules only, although these must be<br />
clear enough to respect the principle <strong>of</strong> legality. Second, it reasserts the criteria <strong>of</strong><br />
‘necessity’ and proportionality in the choice <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences. Third, the need for<br />
clear factual evidence about the nature and effects <strong>of</strong> the crime in question as well as<br />
divergent legal situations in Member States which could jeopardise the effective<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> an EU policy. Finally, the Commission reasserts the need for<br />
effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the penalty applicable which might involve the ‘tailoring <strong>of</strong> the sanction<br />
to the crime’. This could involve the use <strong>of</strong> sanctions such as confiscation, for<br />
example. 943<br />
<strong>The</strong> Commission’s Communication makes a clear first attempt at the formulation <strong>of</strong><br />
principles <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong>isation or criteria for such formulation at the EU level. Underlying<br />
this attempt, three main ideas become salient: subsidiarity (the EU should only intervene<br />
if it is shown to be necessary due to the scale and effects <strong>of</strong> the measures needed);<br />
<strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> as ultima ratio (the principle according to which <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> should be <strong>of</strong><br />
last resort); and effectiveness (the demonstrated need that a particular EU policy is not<br />
efficient without the help <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong> sanctions). 944<br />
How the EU in general, or the Commission in particular, will articulate these principles<br />
in practice is yet to be seen. Indeed, as seen in Chapter 3, the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> EC<br />
policies and interests was the strongest argument in the Commission and CJEU’s<br />
reasoning for the need to adopt <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong> measures. Particularly in relation to the<br />
protection <strong>of</strong> EC’s environmental policy via <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong>, there were arguments put<br />
forward that <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> was not necessarily the most effective means to ensure<br />
compliance with environmental policies. 945 However, the CJEU and the Commission<br />
both seemed to assume that <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> could guarantee such effectiveness per se. 946<br />
This suggests that the Commission will have to seek a balance between the criteria <strong>of</strong><br />
effectiveness and that <strong>of</strong> ultima ratio. <strong>The</strong> necessity for this balance is indeed indirectly<br />
voiced in the Communication when, the need for more ‘factual evidence’ is mentioned<br />
by the Commission. In particular, the Commission mentions ‘Impact Assessments’<br />
943 Ibid., 7-8.<br />
944 A. Klip, “Editorial: <strong>European</strong> Criminal Policy”, ibid., 6.<br />
945 M. Faure, “<strong>European</strong> Environmental Criminal Law”, supra note 480; and B. Lange,<br />
“Environmental Criminal Law in a <strong>European</strong> Context”, supra note 481.<br />
946 See chapter 3.<br />
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