The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
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<strong>The</strong>re is a clear focus on harmonisation <strong>of</strong> ‘minimum maximum’ sentences but not<br />
‘maximum’ sentences for example. 672 In fact, Elholm argues that on occasion some<br />
Member States with a history <strong>of</strong> leniency, while implementing several framework<br />
decisions, chose to upgrade their national penalties not only to the minimum imposed<br />
by the framework decision but, on occasion, to penalties more severe than the ones<br />
proposed by the <strong>European</strong> <strong>Union</strong> itself. In general, regarding penalties, the author finds<br />
that,<br />
“investigation <strong>of</strong> the Nordic countries shows that more than half the framework<br />
decisions have led to extensions <strong>of</strong> the penalty scales in one or more <strong>of</strong> the Nordic<br />
countries. In several cases the minimum and/ or maximum penalty for certain crimes<br />
have even more than doubled in one or more countries.” 673<br />
This implementation by the Nordic countries shows how the national implementation<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten goes beyond the EU standard yet still complies with it. In the context <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong><br />
<strong>law</strong> and, in particular, in the context <strong>of</strong> the implementation <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong>ising provisions,<br />
such implementation can translate into an increase in the severity <strong>of</strong> the national<br />
standard <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong>isation and punishment.<br />
In fact, the examples <strong>of</strong> actual and potential extended <strong>criminal</strong>isation in the EU space<br />
given throughout the chapter, reflect the paradox <strong>of</strong> minimum harmonisation in<br />
<strong>criminal</strong> matters: whilst the harmonisation <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> envisaged was minimal,<br />
focusing merely on minimum elements constituent <strong>of</strong> crimes and penalties, this was<br />
sufficient to have a significant impact on national legal orders namely by increasing<br />
their scope <strong>of</strong> formal <strong>criminal</strong>isation. In fact, it was seen how many Member States<br />
introduced new <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences or expanded the scope <strong>of</strong> pre-existing ones,<br />
introduced <strong>criminal</strong> liability to legal persons or expanded the pre-existing framework <strong>of</strong><br />
such accountability, and introduced minimum maximum sentences - at times beyond<br />
672 Indirectly however the fact that most framework decisions set the condition that penalties<br />
must be ‘proportional’ does add some limitation to the measure <strong>of</strong> punishment at national level.<br />
Moreover, all EU Member States have abolished the death penalty, see, for example, E. Baker,<br />
“<strong>The</strong> Emerging Role <strong>of</strong> the EU as a Penal Actor”, note 13 supra. Regardless <strong>of</strong> these two<br />
elements, the EU does not engage in the definition <strong>of</strong> what it thinks should be the actual<br />
maximum penalty applicable.<br />
673 T. Elholm, “Does EU Criminal Cooperation Necessarily Mean Increased Repression”, supra<br />
note 637, 207; for the details on specific examples see pages 193-203. To be sure however,<br />
regardless <strong>of</strong> an increase in imprisonment rates in Nordic countries, rates have been relatively<br />
stable when compared with other legal systems. See comparable data on ‘World Prison Brief’,<br />
available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/search=europe&x=Europe.<br />
176