The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
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the threshold demanded by EU <strong>law</strong>. This however, was not without limitations, as it<br />
will be seen further below.<br />
3.3. Pressure on more lenient systems<br />
In addition to the trend <strong>of</strong> increasing <strong>criminal</strong>isation, harmonisation - as envisaged in<br />
ECL - places more pressure on more lenient legal systems than on more severe ones.<br />
This is so as Member States are required to <strong>criminal</strong>ise at least the conduct defined in<br />
the Framework Decisions but can <strong>criminal</strong>ise further if they choose to do so. <strong>The</strong>y are<br />
required to introduce liability <strong>of</strong> legal persons in certain cases but allowed to introduce<br />
<strong>criminal</strong> liability in relation to more conducts. Finally, Member States are asked to<br />
introduce minimum maximum sentences but yet again given freedom to retain or<br />
introduce higher minimum maximum penalties than the ones set by the framework<br />
decisions. In fact, no framework decision establishes a ceiling <strong>of</strong> punishment, liability or<br />
<strong>criminal</strong>isation. This implies that Member States with more lenient <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong>s will<br />
more likely be required to introduce new higher standards in order to comply with the<br />
minimum EU standard. On the contrary, less lenient States are less likely to have to alter<br />
(or to alter more significantly) their national provisions, for they are more likely to<br />
already meet the minimum standard set by the EU’s legal acts. This was seen throughout<br />
the chapter. Member States whose national <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> provided for definitions <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>criminal</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences which were narrower than those proposed by the Framework Decision<br />
had to broaden the scope <strong>of</strong> behaviours covered by the national norm in order to meet<br />
the requirements <strong>of</strong> the EU framework decisions. On the contrary, Member States whose<br />
national <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> already provided for the <strong>criminal</strong>isation <strong>of</strong> those conducts did not<br />
have to alter national <strong>law</strong> as national provisions already <strong>criminal</strong>ised the behaviour at<br />
stake. Likewise, it was also seen how some Member States who did not envisage the<br />
liability <strong>of</strong> legal persons had to expand national rules on liability in order to meet the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> the diverse framework decisions. Conversely, national legal orders<br />
which already provided for the liability <strong>of</strong> legal persons did not have to expand the<br />
scope <strong>of</strong> their national liability provisions as these already met the minimum<br />
requirement <strong>of</strong> the framework decisions.<br />
Moreover, because most measures until the entry into force <strong>of</strong> the Treaty <strong>of</strong> Lisbon<br />
focused primarily on <strong>criminal</strong>isation and facilitation <strong>of</strong> prosecution (and less so on<br />
procedural rights, for example), the bias towards an upper trend in severity <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> is further accentuated. This suggests that EU <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> sets in motion a<br />
dynamic where harmony between different domestic legal systems is sought through a<br />
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