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The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)

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contemporary societies that primarily affects public goods and is complex in structure. It<br />

will be suggested that this focus on Euro-crime was brought about by rationales such as<br />

the fight against organised crime, the protection <strong>of</strong> EC interests and policies and, later,<br />

on the protection <strong>of</strong> fundamental rights (mainly, victims’ rights). In this sphere <strong>of</strong> ECL,<br />

the EU deploys a specific legal apparatus to secure the <strong>criminal</strong>isation and punishment<br />

<strong>of</strong> these <strong>of</strong>fences. It will be contended that the intensity <strong>of</strong> the EU’s <strong>criminal</strong>isation <strong>of</strong><br />

Euro-crime is high and has the potential to bring about harsher <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> across the<br />

<strong>European</strong> <strong>Union</strong>. This is so as the EU tends to adopt very broad definitions <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong>fences (which potentially lead domestic legal orders to introduce new crimes or<br />

enlarge the scope <strong>of</strong> pre existent <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences); seeks to extend liability not just to<br />

natural persons but also to legal persons (<strong>of</strong>ten expanding the type <strong>of</strong> liable subjects at<br />

national level); and seeks to harmonise the minimum levels <strong>of</strong> maximum penalties (but<br />

not maximum levels). This severity in the <strong>criminal</strong>isation <strong>of</strong> Euro-crime is further<br />

emphasised by the way that <strong>criminal</strong>isation is envisaged through minimal<br />

harmonisation, which places added pressure on more lenient <strong>criminal</strong> justice systems.<br />

This potentially affects the latter more as these are more likely to have to amend their<br />

national provisions in order to meet the minimum EU standard. On the contrary, more<br />

severe legal orders will more likely already meet such a minimum standard <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>criminal</strong>isation and punishment.<br />

<strong>The</strong> second dynamic <strong>of</strong> ECL engages the State as a penal actor and seeks to enhance the<br />

national punitive apparatus by creating new tools that are at the disposal <strong>of</strong> Member<br />

States for investigation, prosecution and punishment beyond national borders. This<br />

dimension <strong>of</strong> ECL reinforces the ius puniendi <strong>of</strong> the State. It no longer necessarily<br />

follows the thematic narratives <strong>of</strong> Euro-crime, focusing rather on a broader range <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>criminal</strong>ity (potentially any <strong>criminal</strong>ity) and engages with a variety <strong>of</strong> domains in<br />

national <strong>criminal</strong> justice systems (from evidence to custodial sentences or financial<br />

penalties, among others). This second dimension is more recent in the history <strong>of</strong> ECL<br />

and was enhanced particularly by the introduction <strong>of</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> mutual recognition<br />

in <strong>criminal</strong> matters in 1999. 54 This principle requires Member States to recognise and<br />

enforce each other’s judicial decisions in <strong>criminal</strong> matters. In particular, mutual<br />

recognition largely restricts the capacity <strong>of</strong> the executing State to refuse or set conditions<br />

for cooperation, by imposing swift procedures and limiting grounds for refusal to<br />

cooperate. In doing so the principle acquires a clear punitive bias, potentially favouring<br />

more ‘active’ States - those who more readily prosecute - as these will more likely make<br />

use <strong>of</strong> these EU tools for enhanced investigation, prosecution and punishment. Certain<br />

features <strong>of</strong> mutual recognition further emphasise this punitive impetus, particularly the<br />

54<br />

Presidency Conclusions, Tampere <strong>European</strong> Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, para 33.<br />

25

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