The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
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“For that purpose, whilst the choice <strong>of</strong> penalties remains within their discretion, they<br />
must ensure in particular that infringements <strong>of</strong> Community <strong>law</strong> are penalized under<br />
conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to<br />
infringements <strong>of</strong> national <strong>law</strong> <strong>of</strong> a similar nature and importance and which, in any<br />
event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” 223<br />
In Greek Maize the Court set two general obligations upon Member States. First, an<br />
obligation <strong>of</strong> assimilation or equivalence, by requiring Member States to ensure that<br />
breaches <strong>of</strong> Community <strong>law</strong> are sanctioned on conditions, substantive and procedural,<br />
analogous to those applying to breaches <strong>of</strong> national <strong>law</strong> <strong>of</strong> a similar nature and<br />
importance; and that national authorities must proceed in relation to breaches <strong>of</strong><br />
Community <strong>law</strong> with the same diligence as they use in implementing national <strong>law</strong>. And,<br />
second, an obligation <strong>of</strong> efficacy, holding that whilst Member States retain a choice <strong>of</strong><br />
sanctions, measures taken should in every case confer on the sanction an effective,<br />
proportionate and dissuasive character.<br />
Klip has suggested that this decision can cause difficulties <strong>of</strong> interpretation in some legal<br />
orders as the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute at a national level can be<br />
discretionary in some Member States. Whilst in some national legal orders prosecution<br />
<strong>of</strong> crimes is pursued based on the principle <strong>of</strong> legality, which holds that all <strong>of</strong>fences that<br />
come to the attention <strong>of</strong> the police or the prosecution must be prosecuted; other legal<br />
orders allow for more discretion, in accordance with the principle <strong>of</strong> opportunity, which<br />
conveys that a prosecutor may decide not to prosecute based on general interest. In<br />
practice, however, differences between the two are not very steep as both principles<br />
allow for exceptions and have qualifications made to them. According to Klip the<br />
enforcement obligation set by the CJEU<br />
“... does not require Member States to do the impossible. In other words, if the case has<br />
been seriously investigated and there is simply insufficient evidence to sustain a<br />
conviction, a Member State may refrain from bringing charges, on condition that it<br />
would do the same with regard to the enforcement <strong>of</strong> national <strong>law</strong> unrelated to <strong>Union</strong><br />
<strong>law</strong>.” 224<br />
<strong>The</strong> requirement <strong>of</strong> ‘effectiveness’ set by the CJEU in Greek Maize can also leave some<br />
room for doubt as to the exact meaning <strong>of</strong> the ‘effective, dissuasive and proportional’<br />
character <strong>of</strong> a sanction; the Court did not elaborate upon this. Harding <strong>of</strong>fered some<br />
guidance in how to read these these criteria. First, the author notes that the Court, in it’s<br />
223 Para 24, ibid..<br />
224 A. Klip, <strong>European</strong> Criminal Law, supra note 15, 251.<br />
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