The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
The evolution of European Union criminal law (1957-2012)
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persons acting together; in the framework <strong>of</strong> a <strong>criminal</strong> organisation; or the <strong>of</strong>fender<br />
having previously committed <strong>of</strong>fences <strong>of</strong> the same nature. 934<br />
Beyond those mentioned above, other harmonisation measures are currently being<br />
proposed. <strong>The</strong> <strong>European</strong> Commission has already put forward a proposal for a Directive<br />
on attacks against information systems, which will replace the Framework Decision on<br />
attacks against information systems. 935 Similarly to the previous two Directives<br />
mentioned, the scope <strong>of</strong> conduct that the Directive will require Member States to<br />
<strong>criminal</strong>ise, is broader than that <strong>of</strong> the Framework Decision. For example, the proposed<br />
Directive calls for the <strong>criminal</strong>isation <strong>of</strong> new methods <strong>of</strong> committing cyber crimes—<br />
such as the use <strong>of</strong> bonnets. 936<br />
2.1.2. Protecting EU interests and policies via the <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong><br />
Harmonisation, in the context <strong>of</strong> Article 83(2) TFEU, is at the centre <strong>of</strong> ECL’s<br />
development, currently. <strong>The</strong> article provides that, if the approximation <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong>s<br />
and regulations <strong>of</strong> the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective<br />
implementation <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Union</strong> policy in an area that has been subject to harmonisation<br />
measures, directives may establish minimum rules regarding the definition <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fences<br />
and sanctions, in the area at stake. This provision affords a clear competence for the<br />
<strong>Union</strong> to reinforce its policies via the use <strong>of</strong> <strong>criminal</strong> norms as well as the application <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>criminal</strong> sanctions. Article 325(4) TFEU also provides this competence in relation to the<br />
EU’s financial interests.<br />
As shown throughout the thesis, the narrative <strong>of</strong> protection <strong>of</strong> EC interests was for the<br />
most part, developed indirectly. This was so because, for a significant period <strong>of</strong> ECL’s<br />
<strong>evolution</strong>, the EC did not have a recognised competence to seek the protection <strong>of</strong> its own<br />
interests and policies via <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong>. Nonetheless, this protection was sought indirectly<br />
via third pillar instruments as well as through the influence <strong>of</strong> the CJEU. This influence<br />
culminated in two important CJEU decisions in which the Court recognised competence<br />
for the EC to adopt <strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> measures in the context <strong>of</strong> its environmental and<br />
transport policies when these aimed at fighting serious environmental crime. <strong>The</strong> use <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>criminal</strong> <strong>law</strong> to protect EC policies was controversial at different levels, as it touched<br />
upon a number <strong>of</strong> difficult themes. <strong>The</strong> first <strong>of</strong> which related to the legitimacy and<br />
934 Article 9 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), ibid..<br />
935 Proposal for a Directive <strong>of</strong> the <strong>European</strong> Parliament and <strong>of</strong> the Council on attacks against<br />
information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, COM(2010)<br />
517 final, Brussels, 30.9.2010.<br />
936 Article 6 <strong>of</strong> the Proposal, ibid..; ‘Bonets are networks <strong>of</strong> private computers infected with<br />
malicious s<strong>of</strong>tware and controlled, as a group, without the owners’ knowledged; see also page 3<br />
<strong>of</strong> the proposal for more details on what bonets are and how they operate.<br />
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