The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius - College of Stoic Philosophers

64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS
whole of virtue, that is, as much as man s nature is
capable
of.
The prime principle in man s constitution is social.
The next in order is not to yield to the persuasions of the
body, when they are not conformable to the rational
principle, which must govern. The third is freedom from
error and from deception. Let then the ruling principle
holding fast to these things go straight on and it has what
is its own (vn, 55). The emperor selects justice as the
virtue which is the basis of all the rest (x, 11), and this
had been said long before his time.
It is true that all people have some notion of what is
meant by justice as a disposition of the mind, and some
notion about acting in conformity to this disposition ;
but
experience shows that men s notions about justice are as
confused as their actions are inconsistent with the true
notion of justice. The emperor
s notion of justice is clear
enough, but not practical enough for all mankind. Let
there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the
things which come from the external cause ; and let there
be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal
cause, that is, let there be movement and action ter
minating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy
nature (ix, 31). In another place (ix, 1) he says that
he who acts unjustly acts impiously, which follows of
course from all that he says in various places. He insists
on the practice of truth as a virtue and as a means to
virtue, which no doubt it is for :
lying even in indifferent
things weakens the understanding and ; lying maliciously
is as great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of,
viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, and
viewed with respect to consequences. He couples the
notion of justice with action. A man must not pride
himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head,
but he must exhibit his justice in act, like St James notion
of faith. But this is
enough.