Ibid - Australian Army

Land Warfare Studies Centre 4
requirement and technological feasibility. In their study of why
military organisations fail in war, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch
have pointed to the interaction of three core factors: failure to learn,
failure to anticipate and failure to adapt. 8 This taxonomy of
misfortune can be minimised by effective doctrine or made worse
by flawed doctrine. Doctrine is therefore of critical importance in
a modern army; it helps provide a philosophical impetus for
thinking about the needs of learning, anticipation and adaptation by
attempting to identify the constants and the variables in war.
However, it is important to note that military thought and military
doctrine are not synonymous. Military thought can often be
individual and can take place outside military establishments.
Military doctrine, on the other hand, is usually institutional in focus
and internal in nature. While a military thinker might inspire a
cohort of admirers to implement his ideas, this informal approach
can never be a substitute for institutional acceptance. 9 As the
French soldier Marshal Ferdinand Foch once put it, in a modern
military culture there must be a common way of objectively
approaching military problems by organised examination and
analysis. 10 A modern army defines itself by its doctrine, which
should encapsulate institutional theories about warfighting,
equipment and training. Unlike individual military thought, modern
doctrinal formulation is not an abstract process. It is influenced by
the interaction of personalities, hierarchies, ideas and internal
compromises and by the institutional realities of intra-service
politics. Effective doctrine requires acceptance across an army; it
8 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of
Failure in War, The Free Press, New York, 1990, pp. 26–8; 233–43.
9
Brian Holden Reid, A Doctrinal Perspective 1988–98, The Occasional
No. 33, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, May 1998,
p. 13.
10 Ferdinand Foch, The Principles of War, Chapman and Hall, London,
1918, p. 18. See also Major General I. B. Holley, ‘The Doctrinal
Process: Some Suggested Steps’, Military Review, April 1979, LIX, iv,
pp. 2–13.