Ibid - Australian Army

43
Study Paper No. 301
Army doctrine. ‘Operational art’, observed the 1992 Fundamentals,
‘is the art of winning campaigns. It fits between tactics, the art of
winning battles and strategy—the art of winning wars. It is the art
of using tactical events, either battle or the refusal to give battle, to
achieve success’. 173 Various conceptual components of operational
art—
the centre of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, the
culminating point and tempo—were discussed in the 1992 pamphlet
as major features in Australian campaign planning and execution. 174
Success in the practice of operational art was linked firmly to the
use of directive control as ‘a philosophy of command and a system
for conducting operations’. 175
The 1992 pamphlet made no mention of the special characteristics
of Australian doctrine outlined in the 1977 and 1985 editions of
The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations. The new pamphlet
focused on what it described as ‘Influences on Australian Doctrine’
based on policy and changes in circumstances. These influences
were described as defence policy, strategic circumstances, level of
threat, technological advances, experience from operational service
and training, and agreements with allies. 176
The A21 Review and Short-warning Conflict, 1994–96
After the publication of the 1992 Fundamentals, the most
significant events in Army doctrine development stemmed from the
A21 Review between 1994 and 1996. This review had been
recommended by the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in
July 1994 and was announced in the November 1994 White Paper.
The main aim of the review was ‘the defining of an appropriate
173
174
175
176
Ibid., para. 3.15.
Ibid., paras 3.19 – 3.32.
Ibid., para. 3.6.
Ibid., para. 8.2.