Ibid - Australian Army

77
Study Paper No. 301
1997 and 1999 in a way that was as dramatic as that of the years
from 1972 to 1977.
The Australian Army would clearly benefit from a broader
intellectual approach to doctrine that reflects a better appreciation
of the impact of social and political factors in analysing future war.
One measure might be to integrate the talents of the Doctrine
Steering Group, the CATDC, the Land Warfare Studies Centre
(LWSC) and the Command and Staff College. In particular,
selecting a cadre of the Army’s best and brightest Staff College
graduates to work on doctrine—perhaps along the lines of the US
School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)—would stiffen the
intellectual rigour of the doctrinal process.
Conclusion
In November 1978, Robert O’Neill, one of Australia’s most
distinguished military intellectuals, argued that adopting the policy
of continental defence did not absolve Australian forces from
maintaining a forward-defence capability from their own soil. ‘I
believe’, stated O’Neill, ‘that it is a sine qua non of an effective
defence posture that Australia should have forces which can strike
at targets as far from the coast as two thousand miles’. 310
Unfortunately, in the years that followed O’Neill’s statement,
Australian defence planners emphasised the reach of air–sea forces
rather than of air–sea–land forces in a joint strategy.
Consequently, by the late 1980s, strategic guidance had forced the
Army to develop a defensive and reactive doctrine for low-level
continental defence, which, while challenging in its immense
geographic implications, was also insular and one-dimensional in
operational focus. By the 1990s, the Army’s role in continental
defence was confronted by great changes in the international
strategic environment. Army doctrine, derived from strategic policy
310
Robert O’Neill, The Defence of Continental Australia, Working Paper
No. 1, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National
University, Canberra, November 1978, p. 1.