Ibid - Australian Army

63
Study Paper No. 301
implement more informed and accurate decisions at a faster rate
than the enemy’. 262
The 1999 Fundamentals sees modern land warfare as characterised
by the technological transformation of the conventional battlefield
with linear fronts and flanks to a more dynamic battlespace based
on nonlinear or distributed operations. 263 To increase its capacity to
wage nonlinear operations, the Army seeks to embrace what it
describes as Network-centric Warfare (NCW): the effective
integration of sensor systems, command support systems and
weapons systems throughout the battlespace to synchronise military
engagements in a theatre of operations. 264 NCW is an expensive and
complex way of integrating combat assets, and it is by no means
certain that the land force will ever possess sufficient resources to
employ such a system. Nevertheless, NCW is viewed as particularly
relevant to the Australian Army because it permits relatively small,
high-technology forces to achieve disproportionate effects
throughout the battlespace. 265
LWD 1, 1999 seeks to integrate the Army’s combat capability with
the application of technology, training and ethos. The method by
which the Army generates its capacity to fight and win is described
as fighting power, a term derived from recent British military
doctrine. 266 Fighting power combines three components:
an intellectual component (knowledge through professional
mastery); a moral component (the will to fight, which draws on the
ANZAC tradition); and a physical component (the means to
fight). 267 Six interlinked elements of land force capability underpin
physical fighting power—people, organisation, support and
262
263
264
265
266
267
Ibid., pp. 4-5 – 4-7.
Ibid., p. 4-11.
Ibid., pp. 4-11 – 4-14.
Ibid., pp. 4-15 – 4-17.
Design for Military Operations: The British Military Doctrine 1996,
pp. 4-1 – 4-7.
The Fundamentals of Land Warfare 1999, pp. 5-2; 5-5.