Ibid - Australian Army

Land Warfare Studies Centre 8
the inter-war period. 22 From the outset, Army doctrine
development was hampered by the wider difficulty of marrying
defence policy with appropriate strategic concepts and a realistic
force structure—all of which were in the process of emerging
during the 1970s. 23
The Impact of the 1976 White Paper and Organisational Change on
Army Doctrine
The difficulties involved in the transition from forward defence to
the defence of Australia were exemplified by the November 1976
White Paper, Australian Defence. 24 This document spelt out a new
policy of self-reliance in an alliance framework. In defining selfreliance,
the White Paper stated that, while overseas operations
could not be ruled out, ‘we believe that operations are much more
likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some distant or
forward theatre and that our Armed Services would be conducting
joint operations as the Australian Defence Force’. 25 It went on to
state that a self-reliant posture required a substantial force-in-being,
which needed to be capable of military expansion to deal with
unfavourable developments. 26
22
23
24
25
26
The term ‘continental defence’ was used to describe defence policy in
1975. For a discussion of continental defence in the inter-war years,
see David Horner, ‘Australian Army Strategic Planning Between the
Wars’, in Serving Vital Interests: Australia’s Strategic Planning in
Peace and War, eds Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, University of New
South Wales, Canberra, 1996, pp. 75–101 and Brett Lodge, Lavarack:
Rival General, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998, chaps 4–6.
For the evolution of continental defence thinking, see Department of
Defence, Defence Report 1974, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1974 and Defence Report 1975, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975.
Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976.
Ibid., p. 10, para. 6.
Ibid., p. 12, para. 21.