Ibid - Australian Army

65
Study Paper No. 301
‘knowledge edge’ was the highest capability development priority
listed in ASP 97. 275
In LWD 1, 1999, the Army concentrates on developing its ability to
link sensors (the means of information collection) to shooters
(battlespace weapons systems). The aim is to gain near real-time
awareness and superior command and control arrangements in the
future. 276
Overall, the 1999 Fundamentals symbolises the end of twenty-five
years of continental defence doctrine. It breaks the mode of
insularity and rigidity that gripped Army doctrine between 1992
and 1997. In contrast LWD 1, 1999 is a forward-looking document
that concentrates firmly on maritime-littoral operations in a new
strategic environment, envisaging the use of weapons systems
derived from the information revolution. It is hoped that the
‘knowledge edge’ created by the information age will enable the
Army to play a major role in joint operations in the 21st century.
Much of LWD 1, 1999 will be open to debate, controversy and
challenge—particularly aspects of manoeuvre warfare and logistical
support—which is part of LWD 1’s intent. From this perspective, it
is possible that the new pamphlet may come to serve the same
‘devil’s advocate’ purpose as the US Army’s 1976 version of FM
100-5, Operations. Like the latter document, the 1999
Fundamentals may serve as the catalyst for a fundamental revision
of land force doctrine in the next century.
Problems in Australian Army Doctrine, 1972–99
There are perhaps two ways of viewing the development of
Australian Army doctrine from the release of TIB 28 in 1975 to the
publication of LWD 1 in 1999. On one level, there can be little
doubt that it was a considerable achievement for the Army to
develop, over a period of a quarter of a century, a body of coherent
doctrine for defending continental Australia. From another
275
276
Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997, pp. 56–60.
The Fundamentals of Land Warfare 1999, p. 6-14.