Ibid - Australian Army

Land Warfare Studies Centre 42
was on low-level and escalated low-level conflict. The 1992
Fundamentals defined the difference between low-level and
escalated low-level conflict as lying in ‘the preparedness of the
enemy to directly confront [Australian] military forces’. 168
In developing an Australian joint military strategy to counter
low-level conflict, the key tasks of the land force would be to
conduct reconnaissance and surveillance; protect vital assets; and to
intercept, capture and destroy the enemy. 169 While such tasks
defined a defensive posture, MLW One 1.1, 1992, insisted that the
Army would continue to pursue offensive operations based on an
indirect approach to strategy:
The execution of these security operations . . . will be offensive.
The objective will be to commit small forces with high mobility and
firepower to dislocate the enemy by aggressive action, manoeuvre,
concealment, timely intelligence and effective deception. This
concept for operations seeks to wrest the initiative from the enemy
through effective manoeuvre, not through attrition. Hence it may be
regarded as an indirect approach. 170
The indirect approach reinforced the use of manoeuvre as the basis
of Army’s doctrine for applying the principles of concentration of
force, economy of effort, and surprise to destroy or disrupt the
enemy. 171 ‘Manoeuvre’, stated the 1992 Fundamentals, ‘may
enable smaller forces to succeed against larger forces. Manoeuvre is
the preferred tactical approach of the Australian Army’. 172
The major innovation in the 1992 Fundamentals was, however, the
concept of the operational art. The planning and conducting of
campaigns at the operational level of war, which had first been
outlined in the 1985 Fundamentals, was expanded and refined in
the 1992 edition by the introduction of the operational art into
168
169
170
171
172
Ibid., para. 5.17.
Ibid., para. 5.23.
Ibid., para. 5.24.
Ibid., para. 3.38.
Ibid., para. 3.42.