Ibid - Australian Army

Land Warfare Studies Centre 66
perspective, it is possible to argue that Army doctrine in this period
became too narrow and inward looking, and ceased to have
a meaningful influence on the formulation and shape of strategic
guidance. According to this latter view, inadequate doctrine was
partly responsible for a growing perception in the 1990s that the
Army had become the Cinderella service—a land force confined to
a constabulary role in northern Australia and seemingly unwilling
or unable to influence broader post–Cold War strategic thinking in
Australia. One way of evaluating the merits of these contending
positions is to examine briefly some of the key problems Australian
Army doctrine developers faced from the early 1970s to the late
1990s.
Four main problems can be identified in the development of
Australian Army doctrine since 1972. First, Army doctrine
development did not have the benefit of clear strategic guidance for
fifteen years between 1972 and 1987. Second, while the Australian
Army has produced a considerable body of doctrinal literature,
doctrine development has long suffered from a lack of central
direction. Third, the Army’s powerful heritage of tactical excellence
has often worked to prevent a full embrace of some of the more
difficult challenges posed by operational-level warfare. Fourth,
there has been the presence of an anti-intellectual culture within the
Army, which has sometimes limited the development of the type of
vigorous debate and feedback of ideas that are necessary to nourish
doctrine.
Lack of Strategic Guidance
The Army’s doctrinal movement away from forward defence
towards defending continental Australia would have been
challenging even under ideal circumstances. The problem of
strategic guidance that the Army encountered between withdrawal
from Vietnam in 1972 and the release of the 1987 White Paper
made
a difficult challenge even more complicated.