Ibid - Australian Army

Land Warfare Studies Centre 56
accept a manoeuvrist approach to operations, but he also declared
the plan to be ‘out of harmony’ with ASP 97. He went on to state:
A21 was a passive, defensive strategy not only in the operational
sense; but worse, it was condemning the Army to a bit part in
defence thinking . . . When I took over this job 8–9 months ago it
was clear that the Army had to change direction. It was also clear
that some of our long-held assumptions had to go. 230
The Chief of Army went on to list what he described as A21’s ‘fatal
flaws’. First, A21 was too one-dimensional and insular; second, it
was too continental in approach; third, it was overly positional and
static, ‘denying tactical manoeuvre above unit level’; fourth and
‘worst of all it was based on the policy that the Army could play no
part in the maritime strategy called for in ASP 97, at least until the
blue-water Maginot Line of the air–sea gap was breached’. 231 The
Army had to realise that the new priority in defence policy was the
desire to resolve security challenges as far from Australian soil as
possible. Lieutenant General Hickling went on to state:
The Army has to get into the business of operating in a maritime
setting, as well as being able to operate effectively on the Australian
continent as a defence of last resort. Consequently, as I told people
at the [1998] CA’s Exercise, I have committed myself to a maritime
strategy; and as a result I have nailed Army’s colours to that mast. 232
The Army had to put priority into forces that could be used to
project power and influence the maritime approaches, and it had to
accept the need for increased force readiness. 233
The new thinking outlined by Lieutenant General Hickling was
reflected in the decision to review Army doctrine and to create
a new Land Warfare Doctrine structure to replace the Manual of
230
231
232
233
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., pp. 1–2.
Ibid., pp. 3–4. Emphasis added.
Ibid., p. 4.