Ibid - Australian Army

19
Study Paper No. 301
vehicles and aircraft, but a realistic assessment of the capabilities of
the national infrastructure of ports, roads and railways. 69
The third characteristic of logistic support was recognised as a key
element in mounting successful operations. The 1977
Fundamentals noted that ‘the availability of logistic support may
well be the principal limiting factor on the nature and size of force
committed to operations, and on the scale, intensity and duration of
operations in which force can be sustained’. 70 Under the fourth
characteristic of austerity, the Army had to be structured and
employed carefully at the end of a long and vulnerable line of
communication.
Forward-deployed forces would have to operate by conserving
limited resources and by realising that they had the backing of
a support area with limited industrial capacity. 71
The 1977 Fundamentals stated: ‘austerity implies also that the
Army must look to commanders and staff officers at all levels to
handle the forces available with the skills to compensate, at least in
part, for lack of numbers. Military strategic doctrine will place
emphasis on the indirect approach, and tactical doctrine on
extracting the maximum combat power from austere physical
resources’. 72 The final doctrinal characteristic of resilience placed
an emphasis on the need to survive initial reverses by regrouping to
regenerate combat power. Such an approach required using
dispersed forces and defensive operations in depth by trading space
for time. 73
Collectively the 1977 Fundamentals of Land Force Operations laid
down the foundations for a land force doctrine stressing a new
indirect strategy. The main elements of this emerging doctrine were
69
70
71
72
73
Ibid., paras 408–9.
Ibid., para. 411.
Ibid., paras 412–13.
Ibid., para. 414.
Ibid., paras 415–16.