Ibid - Australian Army

75
Study Paper No. 301
Doctrinal Principle, it was suggested that it would be valuable for
the Army to articulate an ‘Australian Way of Conducting
Operations’ that drew together the various historical strands of the
Australian approach to warfighting in order to clarify a future
direction. 304 However, such a project was not undertaken.
The distinguished British historian, Michael Howard, has argued
that military innovators must seek to be versatile, flexible and
adaptive. In times of relative peace, they must be like ‘intelligent
surf riders spotting the essential currents on which to ride’. 305 An
intellectual failing in the Australian Army during the first half of
the 1990s was a failure to identify such essential currents of change.
There was an almost institutional inclination to assume that defence
policy would continue to reflect enduring features of continental
defence as outlined in the 1987 White Paper. The 1992
Fundamentals reflected this mindset when it failed to anticipate any
changes in defence policy stemming from the end of the Cold War.
The pamphlet stated:
The 1987 [defence] policy was not based on a high level, high
technology threat, nor on providing large expeditionary forces;
instead it was based on the enduring features of Australia’s geostrategic
position. Thus, despite the momentous changes in Europe
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the liberation of Eastern
Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, there was no immediate need to change Australia’s Defence
policy. 306
304
305
306
‘A Perspective on the Operational Art’. Keynote Address to the
Senior Officer Study Period, Command and Staff College, Fort
Queenscliff, 25 September 1995.
‘Outline Plan for the Introduction of a Statement of Doctrinal
Principle into Australian Army Doctrine’, p. 5.
Michael Howard, ‘Military Science in an Age of Peace’,
RUSI Journal, March 1974, CIX, i, p. 8.
The Fundamentals of Land Warfare 1993, para. 4.7. It is interesting to
note that the 1992 Fundamentals seemed to ignore the ADF’s Gulf
War deployment. During the 1990–91 Gulf War, the Army was