Ibid - Australian Army

Land Warfare Studies Centre 52
this maritime concept of strategy envisaged the use of mainly air
and naval forces, the emphasis on reactive, low-level
contingencies—contingencies that lay at the heart of the RTA
plan—was replaced by the concept of a range of possible onshore
and offshore conflicts. 213 This new approach to defence planning
challenged the basic assumptions of the A21 review which were
based on a reaction strategy using detection, protection and
response mainly on Australian soil.
The review advanced three basic tasks for the ADF: defeating
attacks against Australia (DAA), defending Australia’s regional
interests (DRI), and supporting Australia’s global interests (SGI). 214
The concept of warning was defined as having two dimensions:
capability warning for major attack and crisis warning for
short-notice conflict. 215 Although defeating attacks against
Australia remained the core force structure priority, regional
conflicts were declared to be more likely than direct attacks on
Australia. 216
In another challenge to the assumptions of the A21–RTA scheme,
ASP 97 considered that, in terms of defence posture, ‘preparedness
levels will be determined more by the requirements of regional
operations and deployments in support of global interests . . . than
by the needs of defeating attacks on Australia’. 217 The Army was
required to place a regular brigade group at a high level of readiness
to improve response capability. Such a capability was described as
being ‘particularly useful for short notice operations overseas’. 218
This decision affected both the concept behind, and the resources
available to, the RTA scheme as derived from A21 processes.
In particular, it struck at the key assumption of the RTA that ‘the
213
214
215
216
217
218
Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid., pp. 29–34.
Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid., p. 41.
Ibid., p. 65.