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Ibid - Australian Army

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67<br />

Study Paper No. 301<br />

There can be little doubt that the slow evolution of <strong>Australian</strong><br />

strategic guidance seriously affected the <strong>Army</strong>’s ability to formulate<br />

doctrine. As Lieutenant General Hassett recognised in his 1975<br />

Training Directive, the <strong>Army</strong> itself had to develop doctrine suited to<br />

defending continental Australia in a strategic vacuum. 277 Although<br />

the 1976 White Paper sketched a general picture of the policy of<br />

Defence of Australia, for over a decade defining the contribution of<br />

the <strong>Army</strong> became essentially an exercise in successive Chiefs of the<br />

General Staff attempting to interpret the meaning of strategic<br />

guidance.<br />

The problem of inadequate strategic guidance was compounded by<br />

the impact on the <strong>Army</strong> of the organisational changes of the<br />

Dunstan–Bennett era between 1977 and 1984. The time lag<br />

between the <strong>Army</strong>’s field practice and its doctrine development<br />

increased markedly between the late 1970s and early 1980s.<br />

Despite this unfavourable situation, Major General S. N. Gower, a<br />

former head of doctrine and GOC Training Command, has argued<br />

that doctrine development did achieve some considerable<br />

successes—particularly in the first half of the 1980s. ‘The early<br />

80s’, Gower points out, ‘saw the concepts of campaigning and the<br />

operational level of war introduced to the <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Army</strong><br />

doctrinally (concepts everyone has taken up, but no easy feat at the<br />

time), and it was by no means a simple derivative of prevailing US<br />

practice’. 278<br />

In addition, by the time of the 1987 White Paper, the decision to<br />

introduce directive control into <strong>Army</strong> doctrine had been taken in<br />

principle by Lieutenant General Gration. Overall, then, given the<br />

legacy of imprecise strategic guidance from 1972 to 1987, the<br />

<strong>Army</strong>’s adoption of the operational level of war and directive<br />

control by the late 1980s, and subsequently of operational art in the<br />

early 1990s, were important and enduring advances.<br />

277<br />

278<br />

‘Report on Doctrinal Conference’, 16–17 July 1975, p. i.<br />

Letter to the author by Major General S. N. Gower (Retd),<br />

28 September 1998.

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