Ibid - Australian Army

Land Warfare Studies Centre 14
From the outset it was clear that a formal system of timely and
relevant doctrine development based on central direction would be
difficult to implement. Corps school representatives argued that the
absence of a threat and the lack of a concept of operations were
serious obstacles to the development of doctrine in defence of
Australia. 47 Training Command doctrine staff pointed to the
moribund nature of the DIB series and the daunting task of
rewriting some 740 doctrinal pamphlets, many of which were
‘ultra-descriptive’. 48
Reflecting these concerns, the conference chairman, Colonel
Newton, noted that successful doctrinal production required clear
terms of reference, the allocation of adequate manpower and
effective decision-making from Army Office. Newton pointed out
that there was no branch or directorate in Army Office that could
coordinate these requirements. 49 He warned that the Army’s
long-term interests ‘lay in the early approval of a system for the
development and formulation of doctrine. Until a system was
approved by Army Office little could be achieved’. 50 As will be
seen in this paper, the concerns expressed at the 1975 doctrine
conference about the problems that the Army faced in creating an
effective Army-wide doctrine development system were never
satisfactorily resolved. Organisational weaknesses, personnel
shortages and lack of resources were to become almost permanent
problems facing Training Command over the next twenty years.
The TIB 28 Division and the Introduction of the Manual of Land
Warfare, 1976–77
Despite the institutional problems highlighted by Army doctrine
developers at the July 1975 doctrinal conference, sufficient
47
48
49
50
Ibid., p. 10, para. 14.
Ibid., p. 9, para. 7.
Ibid., p. 8, para. 6.
Ibid., p. 10, para. 15. It should be noted that the term Army Office
referred to Army Headquarters.