Ibid - Australian Army

21
Study Paper No. 301
operations in defence of Australia. 75 Because the land force had to
be able to operate over a wide variety of terrain, Army planners
realised that no single formation could be proficient across the
whole range of possible operational circumstances. Land forces
required a capacity for expansion in high-level operations and an
ability to undertake a range of short-term, low-level
contingencies. 76
To operate effectively on Australian soil, the Army identified its
key needs as being better surveillance and improved strategic and
tactical battlefield mobility over long distances. 77 A land-based
surveillance and reconnaissance element, a readily deployable
reaction force and a heavier follow-on force, good communications,
long-range firepower and a night-fighting capability were required
for a ground defence of Australia. 78 All presented formidable
logistics problems for a nation with a limited defence industrial
capacity. 79
Under Lieutenant General Dunstan, Chief of the General Staff from
April 1977 until February 1982, the basic organisational design of
the Army of the 1980s was laid down. Dunstan’s objective was to
create an Army that, by the end of the 1980s, would be capable of
versatile operations and would make efficient use of both regular
and reserve elements. 80 To this end, in February 1980, the
TIB 28 division was reduced from over 18 000 to less than 14 000
75
76
77
78
79
80
Australian Army, ‘Combat Power in the Australian Environment’,
undated paper but circa 1979; ‘Forecast of Capabilities and Operational
Status of the Army at the end of the 1980s’, undated paper but circa
1980.
‘Forecast of Capabilities and Operational Status of the Army at the end
of the 1980s’, para. 1. ‘Combat Power in the Australian Environment’,
para. 5.
‘Combat Power in the Australian Environment’, paras 18–21.
Ibid., para. 29.
Ibid., paras 30–7; para. 52.
‘Forecast of Capabilities and Operational Status of the Army at the end
of the 1980s’, para. 57.