Ibid - Australian Army

11
Study Paper No. 301
In the wake of its withdrawal from Vietnam and in the face of
major organisational reform of defence, the Army was reduced
from a mixed force of nine battalions of volunteers and national
servicemen to become an all-volunteer force of six battalions. 35
Despite this reduction, the Army did succeed in retaining the
framework
of
a divisional structure in peacetime as an essential basis for training
and expansion. 36 In the mid-1970s, when the Army emerged from
the reorganisation process to confront the problem of doctrine for
operations in defence of Australia, it possessed a new functional
command system. This system comprised Field Force Command,
Logistics Command and Training Command as well as the
framework of a divisional structure based on three task forces each
of two battalions. 37
The 1975 Chief of the General Staff Training Directive and the
Army Doctrine Conference
One of the first important statements on post-Vietnam Army
doctrine came in early 1975 from the Chief of the General Staff
(CGS), Lieutenant General F. G. Hassett. In his 1975 CGS Training
Directive, Lieutenant General Hassett stated that the requirement to
35
36
37
W. J. Hudson, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1980, pp. 11–36;
37–64.
The Army’s strength fell from 41 500 in 1972 to 29 000 in 1975
following the end of national service. See Peter Pedersen, ‘The
Defence of Australia: Australia 1973–1979’, in Duty First: The Royal
Australian Regiment in War and Peace, ed. David Horner, Allen and
Unwin, Sydney, 1990, pp. 281–5.
Major General S. C. Graham, ‘The Requirement for a Divisional
Structure’, 9 August 1972, C Ops Minute No. 320/72 and Major
General S. C. Graham, ‘Infantry Battalions in the ARA’, 12 May 1972,
C Ops Minute No. 209/72. Documents in author’s possession.
Woodman and Horner, ‘Land Forces in the Defence of Australia’,
pp. 38–9; Peter Pedersen, ‘The Defence of Australia: Australia
1973–1979’, pp. 283–5.