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Ibid - Australian Army

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Land Warfare Studies Centre 22<br />

personnel. The aim was to develop a more flexible organisation for<br />

testing new operational concepts that would reflect the impact of<br />

distance on the conduct of the tactical battle and on logistical<br />

support in the field. 81 Although the standard infantry division was<br />

to remain the major type of formation in the <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Army</strong>,<br />

increased attention was to be placed by the <strong>Army</strong> on operations<br />

based on using forces capable of a high degree of dispersion,<br />

mobility and endurance. 82<br />

In broad terms, the <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Army</strong> moved towards a ‘core force’<br />

structure. To maximise limited resources for land operations in<br />

defence of Australia, the <strong>Army</strong> needed a core of essential skills and<br />

capabilities on which expansion could be based in times of need. 83<br />

Implicit in the core force concept was an assumption that warning<br />

time of future conflict would be adequate to allow for expansion. 84<br />

A core force also required a dual capability: heavy formations with<br />

high combat power were required for expansion to higher-level<br />

conflict, while light mobile formations with limited combat power<br />

were needed for shorter-term contingencies. An <strong>Army</strong> paper on<br />

combat power outlined the problem:<br />

We thus have two conflicting force structure requirements. We<br />

require heavy formations with high combat power (that is firepower<br />

and tactical mobility) but such formations tend to have limited<br />

strategic mobility. On the other hand, light formations are more<br />

easily deployed but are generally lower on combat power. This may<br />

lead us to having to adopt two organisations—a light ready<br />

deployable reaction force with a heavier follow up force. 85<br />

The <strong>Army</strong> thus faced a paradox, particularly in equipment needs.<br />

Light airborne equipment needed for strategic mobility was the<br />

81<br />

82<br />

83<br />

84<br />

85<br />

<strong>Ibid</strong>., para. 6.<br />

‘Forecast of Capabilities and Operational Status of the <strong>Army</strong> at the end<br />

of the 1980s’, para. 5.<br />

‘Combat Power in the <strong>Australian</strong> Environment’, paras 7 and 55.<br />

<strong>Ibid</strong>., para. 8.<br />

‘Combat Power in the <strong>Australian</strong> Environment’, para. 22.

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