Ibid - Australian Army
Ibid - Australian Army
Ibid - Australian Army
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Land Warfare Studies Centre 22<br />
personnel. The aim was to develop a more flexible organisation for<br />
testing new operational concepts that would reflect the impact of<br />
distance on the conduct of the tactical battle and on logistical<br />
support in the field. 81 Although the standard infantry division was<br />
to remain the major type of formation in the <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Army</strong>,<br />
increased attention was to be placed by the <strong>Army</strong> on operations<br />
based on using forces capable of a high degree of dispersion,<br />
mobility and endurance. 82<br />
In broad terms, the <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Army</strong> moved towards a ‘core force’<br />
structure. To maximise limited resources for land operations in<br />
defence of Australia, the <strong>Army</strong> needed a core of essential skills and<br />
capabilities on which expansion could be based in times of need. 83<br />
Implicit in the core force concept was an assumption that warning<br />
time of future conflict would be adequate to allow for expansion. 84<br />
A core force also required a dual capability: heavy formations with<br />
high combat power were required for expansion to higher-level<br />
conflict, while light mobile formations with limited combat power<br />
were needed for shorter-term contingencies. An <strong>Army</strong> paper on<br />
combat power outlined the problem:<br />
We thus have two conflicting force structure requirements. We<br />
require heavy formations with high combat power (that is firepower<br />
and tactical mobility) but such formations tend to have limited<br />
strategic mobility. On the other hand, light formations are more<br />
easily deployed but are generally lower on combat power. This may<br />
lead us to having to adopt two organisations—a light ready<br />
deployable reaction force with a heavier follow up force. 85<br />
The <strong>Army</strong> thus faced a paradox, particularly in equipment needs.<br />
Light airborne equipment needed for strategic mobility was the<br />
81<br />
82<br />
83<br />
84<br />
85<br />
<strong>Ibid</strong>., para. 6.<br />
‘Forecast of Capabilities and Operational Status of the <strong>Army</strong> at the end<br />
of the 1980s’, para. 5.<br />
‘Combat Power in the <strong>Australian</strong> Environment’, paras 7 and 55.<br />
<strong>Ibid</strong>., para. 8.<br />
‘Combat Power in the <strong>Australian</strong> Environment’, para. 22.