Ibid - Australian Army

Land Warfare Studies Centre 28
manoeuvre sought to position forces on the battlefield to maximise
firepower. At the operational level of war, the aim of manoeuvre
was different: it aimed at throwing the enemy off balance, wresting
the initiative from him and gaining the freedom of action to impose
one’s own concept of operations. The difference between
manoeuvre at the operational and tactical levels of war concerned
not only the size of forces, but their aim and function. 110
Like its 1977 predecessor, the 1985 Fundamentals devoted a
chapter to what it described as the ‘Australian Doctrinal Approach’.
The five special characteristics of Army doctrine identified in
1977—self-reliance, mobility, logistic support, austerity and
resilience—were revised in 1985. The existing notion of austerity
was particularly emphasised in the new pamphlet. Since the Army
would have to fight at the end of a long, expensive and vulnerable
line of communications backed by a limited logistics, ‘the
requirement for austerity [would] be a prime characteristic of
operations’. 111 Surveillance, intelligence, surprise, deception and
optimal use of the environment were all recommended as methods
to offset austere operating conditions and to help foster ‘lean and
uncluttered’ units. 112
In the 1985 edition of MLW One 1.1, three new special doctrinal
characteristics were introduced. First, the Army needed to be
adaptable to different environments, second it needed to develop
the use of technological advances and, third, land forces were
required to practise dispersion as fundamental to operations. The
characteristic of logistic support identified in 1977 was considered
so vital that, in the 1985 Fundamentals, it was removed as a special
characteristic altogether and given a separate chapter under the title
of Administration. 113
110
111
112
113
Ibid., paras 309–11.
Ibid., para. 521.
Ibid., para. 525.
Ibid., chap. 4.