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G4S Annual Report and Accounts 2011

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Overview Strategic review Performance<br />

Directors’ remuneration report continued<br />

The claw-back mechanism<br />

Any payment under either the annual bonus scheme or the PSP may be<br />

clawed back from the director concerned if the committee so determines<br />

<strong>and</strong>, in the case of misstatement of accounts, where the Audit Committee<br />

concurs. The time period in which the claw back can be made depends on<br />

the reason for the overpayment.<br />

Misstatement of financial accounts<br />

Fraud or reckless behaviour<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> bonus<br />

scheme<br />

up to 2 years<br />

after payment<br />

up to 2 years<br />

after payment<br />

Performance Share<br />

Plan<br />

up to 2 years<br />

after vesting<br />

up to 6 years<br />

after vesting<br />

The amount to be clawed back directly from the executive will be the<br />

overpaid amount after netting off taxes <strong>and</strong> social security deductions.<br />

How have the elements of remuneration<br />

changed year-on-year?<br />

Elements of<br />

remuneration<br />

Base salary<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> bonus<br />

Long-term<br />

incentive<br />

plan<br />

Change<br />

No increase in 2009, 2010 or 2012. An increase was made<br />

in January <strong>2011</strong>.<br />

Unchanged in maxima but the potential payouts on<br />

threshold <strong>and</strong> budgeted profit targets were altered<br />

for one year in <strong>2011</strong> only.<br />

After consultation with major shareholders, a change was<br />

made on the inflation measurement to reflect increasing<br />

global footprint <strong>and</strong> exposure to markets outside the UK.<br />

For 2012 TRS/EPS measurements to be weighted equally.<br />

Link between pay <strong>and</strong> performance<br />

The payouts under the annual bonus scheme <strong>and</strong> long-term incentive plan<br />

in previous years have been made in accordance with the agreed measures.<br />

Where there has been a payout under the annual bonus scheme or<br />

long-term incentive plan, the committee has not exercised any discretion<br />

to increase payments above that to which the executives were entitled<br />

under the applicable rules.<br />

Pay for group executive committee<br />

Number in b<strong>and</strong><br />

Base Pay (£000) <strong>2011</strong> 2010<br />

151–200 0 1<br />

201–250 2 1<br />

251–300 3 4<br />

301–350 1 2<br />

351–400 2 0<br />

The maximum bonus level for the members of the group executive<br />

committee is 100% of base salary.<br />

Elements of remuneration<br />

Elements of<br />

remuneration<br />

Availability<br />

Fixed Base salaries Available to all<br />

employees worldwide<br />

Pensions<br />

Available to most employees<br />

in developed markets<br />

Variable <strong>Annual</strong> bonus Available to all senior<br />

managers worldwide<br />

Long-term incentive plan Available to some senior<br />

managers worldwide<br />

Benefits Car or car allowance Available to all senior<br />

managers worldwide<br />

Protection insurance Available to most employees<br />

in developed markets<br />

Healthcare<br />

Available to all senior<br />

managers worldwide<br />

(a) Base salary <strong>and</strong> benefits<br />

The salaries of the executive directors are reviewed with effect from<br />

1 January each year. Although interim salary reviews may be carried out<br />

following significant changes in responsibility, no such reviews have taken<br />

place since the appointments of the current executive directors. The<br />

salaries take account of benchmarking exercises based on a robust sample<br />

of similarly sized companies by revenue <strong>and</strong> market capitalisation, with a<br />

significant part of their business overseas. They also reflect responsibility,<br />

individual performance, internal relativities <strong>and</strong> salary <strong>and</strong> other market<br />

information supplied by Towers Watson. Base salaries for the executive<br />

directors were frozen in 2009 <strong>and</strong> 2010. However, the position following<br />

two consecutive pay freezes was not consistent with the company’s stated<br />

remuneration policy, <strong>and</strong> the committee took steps to more closely align<br />

base salaries to its competitive mid-market policy in <strong>2011</strong>. At the executive<br />

directors’ request though, the committee has agreed to freeze those<br />

directors’ base salaries again in 2012 in view of the economic circumstances<br />

<strong>and</strong> the pay <strong>and</strong> employment conditions across the group, notwithst<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

the consistently strong performance of the group throughout the period.<br />

(b) Performance-related bonus scheme<br />

For the year under review, the executive directors participated in an<br />

annual performance-related bonus scheme, payments under which were<br />

dependent on the attainment of defined PBTA (profit before tax <strong>and</strong><br />

amortisation) targets of the group, adjusted for the effect of any exceptional<br />

items <strong>and</strong> discontinued operations <strong>and</strong> using constant exchange rates.<br />

The committee believes that PBTA best reflects the various key drivers of<br />

business success within the group. The maximum bonus entitlement for the<br />

executive directors is an amount equal to 125% of base salary (150% in the<br />

case of the chief executive). For <strong>2011</strong>, 75% of maximum bonus entitlement<br />

was payable on achievement of the budgeted target <strong>and</strong> the amount of<br />

bonus increased on a straight-line basis up to 100% of maximum bonus<br />

entitlement for achievement of a stretch profit target. Any bonus due above<br />

50% of the individual’s maximum bonus entitlement would be awarded as<br />

deferred shares which would not vest for three years. For achievement of a<br />

threshold level of profits which is at least 95% of the budgeted profit target,<br />

a bonus payment of 50% of maximum bonus entitlement was due, with no<br />

bonus payable for performance below threshold.<br />

64<br />

<strong>G4S</strong> plc<br />

<strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Accounts</strong> <strong>2011</strong>

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