2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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viii Svante E. Cornell and Halil Magnus Karaveli One of the AKP’s major accomplishments has been to shed the anti- European baggage of the Islamic movement. However, the AKP’s enthusiasm for European harmonization reforms had already decreased by the end of 2004. The road ahead for Turkey’s relations with the EU is nevertheless unclear, given the multitude of developments both in the EU and in Turkey that could derail it. Over the coming decade, the twin western vectors that constitute the bedrock of Turkish foreign policy – the relationships with the United States and the EU – are unlikely to unravel. While the Eastern vocation – whether in the Middle East or in the Turkic world – will play a growing role in its calculations, the Turkish leadership is unlikely to shed its primary Western orientation. That does not mean, however, that the bonds connecting Turkey to the West will strengthen; indeed, there is a substantial risk that if left untended, they may weaken. Turkey’s role as a regional force will depend on whether the country will be able to overcome its two existential divides – the issues of religion and ethnicity. Only a Turkey at peace with itself is likely to assume the role of a regional power which the West, most prominently the United States, has been encouraging it to do. Yet such a role is complicated by the essentially reactive nature of Turkish foreign policy, itself a result of the multitude of developments in highly varied bordering regions that affect Turkey, and make it difficult for Ankara to pursue a proactive policy based in a coherent strategy. To become a true regional power, Turkey will have to overcome that limitation. From the limited overview conducted in this study, a great number of different scenarios for Turkey’s future development could be derived. This study proposes three major scenarios, which put most of their attention to the likely domestic development, while taking into account the likely interaction of internal politics with external challenges. The first scenario – a more conservative Turkey – in principle constitutes the extrapolation and continuation of the trends that have been observed during the past decade, which have seen the crumbling of secular politics and the rise of a dominant religious conservatism in both society and the state. The second – a democratic reconciliation – assumes that the AKP, like other
Prospects for a ‘Torn’ Turkey ix dominant political movements, is likely to crumble under its own weight as a result of a sclerosis of power, leaving room for yet another redefinition of the political contest between the competing ideologies of religious conservatism and secularism. The last scenario – a return to military stewardship – could occur if the Islamic conservative movement overplays its hand. It is the least probable scenario. Turkey at 100 will in many ways be recognizable to observers witnessing its 85 th birthday. The greatest surprise would be if the republic at 100 will have broken with its long-standing traditions and succeeded in developing a truly secularizing ethos.
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Turkey in 2023: the Republic at 100
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Conclusions Turkey’s internal and
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Authors’ Bio Svante E. Cornell is
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2008_10_SRP_CornellKaraveli_Turkey

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